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 When first introduced, decoupled payments were thought to have minimal 
impacts on current production decisions and input use. In order to comply with the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requiring all World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies, in 1996 U.S. 
agricultural policies began shifting away from coupled payments, based on current prices, 
production, or output, towards decoupled payments.   
 However, the literature has identified several mechanisms by which decoupled 
payments have the potential to distort production in the current period.  First, risk averse 
producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects.  Second, in 
imperfect credit markets decoupled payments may ease constraints by increasing total 
wealth.   Third, current production decisions may be influenced by the farmer’s 
expectation of future decoupled payment policies, in particular after policy changes in the 
2002 and 2008 Farm Bills.  Fourth, input markets are affected through possible changes 
in the allocation of labor, land, and other inputs.  Lastly, exit deterrence may result in 
fewer people leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs, declining average costs, 
or cross-subsidization.     
 In the theory section, a typical farmer’s expected utility maximization problem 
illustrates that coupled payments are shown to affect optimal allocations of acreage 
(extensive margin) and production inputs (intensive margin) because they are linked to 
current prices, production, or inputs.  In theory, decoupled payments do not affect 
optimal allocations of acreage and production inputs because they are not tied to current 
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prices, production, or inputs.  However, when farmers are allowed to update historical 
base acres and yields upon which future decoupled payments are based, uncertainty 
creates a coupling mechanism between production decisions and decoupled payments.    
 Using FCRS and ARMS farm-level data collected by NASS between 1991 and 
2008, weighted ordinary least squares regression analysis suggests a positive relationship 
between both decoupled payments and other government payments and per acre 
expenditures on agricultural chemicals.  However, decoupled payments may affect the 
intensive margin more than other government payments.  Lastly, the 2008 Farm Bill may 
implicitly create a coupling mechanism because base yield is calculated using an 
Olympic moving average, meaning that each year the historic period changes.  The 
results suggest that current US agricultural policies are production distorting and thus 
may be in violation of standing WTO agreements.     
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 The United States has a long history of supporting farmers, first through 
education and research in the late 1800s, then through income maintenance via price 
supports during the Great Depression.  Price supports continued to be the main form of 
government support to farmers until the introduction of decoupled payments in 1996.  
The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture required all World Trade 
Organization (WTO) member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies 
and move toward decoupled support not based on current production, prices, or inputs.  
Decoupled direct payments were first introduced to U.S. agricultural policy with the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act that began implementing 
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments to farm operators based on historic 
acreage and yields.   
 Direct payments were continued in the two subsequent Farm Bills. The Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI) gave farmers the option of updating 
their base acreage and yields, essentially allowing farmers to change their historical 
acreage and yields upon which decoupled payments were based. The Food, Conservation, 
and Energy Act of 2008 (FCE) continued decoupled payments but gave farmers the 
option of foregoing direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program payments that are based on both national market price and state average yields. 
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In addition, the 2008 Farm Bill permitted farmers to adjust base acreage once again to 
allow for the addition of newly covered commodities.      
 Until recently, the literature on decoupled payments concluded that, in theory, 
decoupled payments do not distort production decisions in the current period since the 
marginal production decision is not altered (Alston & Hurd, 1990; Blandford, de Gorter, 
& Harvey, 1989; Rucker, Thurman, & Sumner, 1995; Sumner & Wolf, 1996) However, 
recent research has offered several mechanisms by which decoupled payments have the 
potential to distort production in the current period. 
    The literature on decoupled payments acknowledges several mechanisms by 
which decoupled payments can become “coupled” to production, prices, or inputs.  First, 
risk averse producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects from 
expectations of continued payments in the future (Hennessy, 1998).  Second, imperfect 
credit markets allow decoupled payments to ease constraints by increasing total wealth 
(Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).   Third, current production 
decisions may be influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, in particular 
after liberal updating was allowed in the 2002 Farm Bill (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010; 
Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008).  Fourth, input markets are affected through possible 
changes in the allocation of labor and land, due to capitalization of these decoupled 
payments in land values (Ahearn, El-Osta, & Dewbre, 2006; Kirwan, 2009).  Lastly, exit 
deterrence may result in fewer farms leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs 
(Chau & de Gorter, 2005), declining average costs, or cross-subsidization (de Gorter, 
Just, & Kropp, 2008).    
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 All five coupling mechanisms can lead to production distortions, thus changing 
input use on the farm directly or indirectly through changes in acreage allocation 
(extensive margin), or farming the same number of acres more intensely to increase 
yields (intensive margin).  The impact of decoupled payments on fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemical use might be greater than the impact on other inputs because of 
their dual role as inputs and possible insurance against low yields (Rajsic, Weersink, & 
Gandorfer, 2009).  Because agricultural chemicals have a negative relationship with 
environmental quality, the use of these inputs is also important to study due to their 
potential impact on the environment. 
 Previous studies have focused on the effects of decoupled payments on 
agricultural output measured in harvested acres (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006) or aggregate 
farm investment (Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004) and find small but significant effects on 
output and investment.  This thesis focuses on the effects of decoupled payments on the 
use of agricultural chemical inputs including pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers.   
 Construction of a typical farmer’s utility maximization problem illustrates the 
difference between the effect of coupled and decoupled payments on production.  In 
theory, decoupled direct payments do not affect a farmer’s optimal allocation of acreage 
or inputs because the payments are based on historic, not current, production.  However, 
if a farmer expects updating to occur, either through government policy changes or the 
implicit design of the policy itself (in the case of the ACRE program introduced in 2008), 
he or she may alter current farm production decisions in order to maximize future profits 
and expected utility.  The theoretical model measures production distortions through 
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changes in optimal acreage allocation (extensive margin) and changes in optimal input 
allocation (intensive margin) due to the effect of decoupled payments and other 
government payments.  The empirical model then tests the effects of decoupled payments 
and other government payments on fertilizer and agricultural chemical use, thus 
measuring possible production distortions through changes to the intensive margin.   
 The theoretical model is tested empirically using data from Farm Costs and 
Returns Surveys (FCRS) and Agricultural Resources and Management Surveys (ARMS) 
collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) between 1991 and 2008.  
Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between both coupled and decoupled government 
payments and the use of agricultural chemicals.  Chow tests indicate the presence of 
structural breaks around the time policy changes occurred in 1996 and 2002.      
 The empirical results support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between both decoupled direct payments and other government payments and agricultural 
chemical expenditures per acre.  Furthermore, the marginal effects of decoupled direct 
payments are greater than the marginal effects of other government payments.  This 
provides evidence that decoupled payments might affect the intensive margin more than 
other government payments and may therefore lead to greater distortions in production.     
 The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides a background on 
agricultural policies in the US, including an explanation of the various forms of 
decoupled payments. Chapter Three provides a review of the literature on mechanisms 
that may couple these payments to prices, production, or inputs, thus distorting 
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production.  Chapter Four examines the farmer’s utility maximization problem with and 
without coupled and decoupled government payments.  Chapter Five explains the 
methodology used in the empirical analysis.  Chapter Six presents summary statistics and 
the results of the ordinary least squares regression estimations.  Lastly, Chapter Seven 




In 1862, the United States Department of Agriculture was created to help improve 
U.S. agriculture, mainly through collecting crop production statistics and dispersing the 
best seed varieties (Ulibarri, 1979).  That role expanded with the passing of Hatch Act in 
1887 creating agricultural experiment stations and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 funding 
cooperative extension agencies around the country.  In the early 20th century, the 
government supported farmers through education, innovation, and some credit and 
marketing programs.  It was not until the Great Depression that the government saw it fit 
to protect farm incomes and commodity prices: the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
established the first income and price supports as well as supply controls.  Prices were 
supported through deficiency payments paid to farmers depending on the quantity they 
produced.  Parity pricing was used to maintain the purchasing power of certain farm 
commodities relative to 1910-1914 levels, considered the ‘Golden Age’ of agriculture, 
with both high farm incomes and prices. 
Price supports are used as a tool to redistribute wealth to farmers while providing 
consumers with food at low prices and are often used in markets that have more inelastic 
demand curves because of lack of product substitution.  Under these circumstances, a 
price increase of one percent results in a decrease in quantity demanded of less than one 
percent because the consumer cannot substitute a similar good.  Agricultural commodities 
such as cotton, feed grains (e.g., corn, oats, barley, and rye), wheat, and soybeans share 
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this characteristic and therefore their production has been heavily subsidized 
(Lichtenberg & Zilberman, 1986; Rausser, 1992).  
Pegging commodity prices to elevated early 20th century levels through parity 
pricing proved problematic because it artificially inflated prices to unsustainable levels 
and gave farmers incentives to produce more than consumers demanded, resulting in 
burdensome surpluses.  Parity pricing may have also lead to capitalization, bidding up the 
value of farmland and other farm assets.  Farmers were able to maintain the purchasing 
power parity policies until 1954, which helped sustain production levels during the Great 
Depression.  
Throughout the 1930s, program-induced maintenance of high prices reduced 
domestic and foreign quantity demanded for U.S. commodities, requiring the government 
to purchase the surplus crops in order to continue supporting farmers while maintaining 
high prices.  During World War II, the US was able to export the surplus crops to Europe, 
reducing the stores of grain that were building up.  After the war, concern grew about a 
possible global recession and the collapse of agricultural prices: the Agricultural Act of 
1949 reinstated the Depression-era price and income supports.  
The 1954 Farm Bill was amended to remove full parity pricing in exchange for 
flexible price supports at less than 100 percent of parity.  Flexible price supports that 
depended on the quantity of commodity produced continued until the 1970s, when a new 
Farm Bill created price supports tied to market price (not historic parity-price) and 
production, called coupled direct payments.  Nevertheless, decades of rigid price supports 
set much higher than market prices resulted in “massive stock accumulation, deficiency 
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payments, export subsidies, and land idling” (Sumner, 2007) in periods of low 
prices.  Short periods of high prices reduced the stockpiles and allowed land to return to 
production. 
 The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) addressed stockpiles by lowering price 
support levels and reducing supply controls, allowing agricultural commodity prices to 
align more with the market.  However, almost all payment programs were coupled to 
production, commodity price, or input use, thus directly affecting farm-level decision 
making as well as distorting foreign and domestic markets.  The 1985 FSA also 
addressed the growing concern over the negative environmental impacts associated with 
agriculture by creating programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program to take 
highly eroded and ecologically vulnerable land out of production (Congress, 
1985).  However, the structure of agricultural support did not change significantly until 
the introduction of decoupled direct payments in the 1996 Federal Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) following the signing of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in 1994.     
Decoupled Payments and the WTO 
The AoA required all World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries to 
reduce trade distorting agricultural policies and move towards decoupled payments not 
based on current production, prices, or inputs.  To this end, the WTO created three 
‘boxes,’ or classifications, of agricultural domestic support and trade policies used to 
determine which types of policies would be allowed and which policies would be 
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restricted to minimize trade-distortion.  The boxes were named amber, blue, and green. 
 Amber box policies, such as tariffs and market price supports, clearly distort trade and 
production.  Developed countries with policies that fall within this box committed to 
reducing their total aggregate measure of support (AMS) by twenty percent within six-
years; developing countries committed to a 13.3 percent reduction within ten-years 
(WTO, 1994).  
AMS is the monetary amount of government support given to a sector of the 
domestic economy.  It includes both government subsidies and consumer transfers that 
result from domestic policies that distort market prices.  Current AMS is calculated per 
commodity and is measured by finding the difference between the world market price 
with historic base years 1986-1988 and the ‘administered price’ or sum of all amber box 
support explicitly or implicitly linked to the production of that commodity and 
multiplying that by the total quantity receiving the administered price (WTO, 1994).  If 
this product is greater than the de minimis amount allowed for that commodity, it is 
counted in the total AMS.  The de minimis clause of the AoA stipulates that there is no 
commitment to reducing amber box subsidies “in any year in which the aggregate value 
of the product-specific support does not exceed 5 per cent of the total value of production 
of the agricultural product in question” (WTO, 1994).  Thus, de minimis support is not 
included in AMS calculations.  However, five percent can account for a great deal: in 
2000, any amber box support for corn with a total AMS less than $917 million was 
exempt under the de minimis clause (OECD, 2008b).  Table 2.1 shows the U.S. de 
minimis values for major crops within the commitment time period.  Because total AMS 
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is measured without reference to a specific commodity, it is possible to reduce AMS by 
reducing the subsidy of one commodity while increasing the subsidy of another 
commodity.  
Table 2.1.  Annual U.S. de Minimis Values for Select Crops, 1995-2000 
Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Barley $51,930 $53,763 $42,825 $34,860 $29,820 $33,549 
Cotton $328,633 $320,492 $298,577 $206,096 $190,581 $212,855 
Maize $1,198,808 $1,251,011 $1,118,630 $946,623 $858,221 $917,138 
Sorghum $73,154 $93,047 $70,007 $43,154 $46,708 $44,510 
Soybeans $730,549 $800,048 $869,811 $675,6560 $614,401 $626,066 
Wheat $496,566 $489,638 $419,368 $337,520 $285,076 $291,868 
Notes: *In U.S. Millions; (OECD, 2008b) 
Policies that fall within the two remaining boxes, green and blue, do not require 
any reduction commitments.  Green box subsidies must not significantly distort trade and 
are funded publically, not by transfers from consumers.  These include decoupled direct 
payments, environmental protection policies, and rural development subsidies.  Blue box 
policies are referred to as the “amber box with conditions” (WTO, 2002) because they 
include supports that are linked to production like amber box policies, but are subject to 
production limits so they are deemed minimally trade-distortive and fully allowed within 
the WTO.  Blue box policies include infra-marginal support policies. 
Because there is only a limit on amber box subsidies and each country determines 
which box their policies fall into, there is an incentive to move policies to the green and 
blue boxes without actually minimizing the trade-distorting effects of the policies (Baffes 
& de Gorter, 2005).  Critics of the WTO’s classification of agricultural policies suggest 
that the system puts developing countries at a disadvantage and does not actually 
liberalize trade (Adams et al., 2001; Chand & Phillip, 2001; Monge-Arino, 
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2007).  Although the system may not be as effective as presumed, it does favor the 
implementation of decoupled payments, as they will always fall into either the green or 
the blue box. 
Decoupled Payments in the US 
 As shown in Table 2.2, between 1986 and 1995, on average 95 percent of the total 
value of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to farmers (Producer Support Estimate 
or PSE1
Table 2.2.  Production Support Estimates: Coupled and Decoupled Payment 
Allocations, 1986-2008 
) was comprised of various coupled payments based on output (e.g. market price 
supports), inputs (e.g. irrigation support), or current farm characteristics such as total land 
area, revenue, and income (e.g. deficiency payments). Decoupled payments made up less 
than five percent of the PSE on average, the majority of which was spent on the new 
Conservation Reserve Program. 






Total Producer Support Estimate* $324,179 $264,436 $248,648 
Coupled Payments: 95.29% 76.29% 70.51% 
Based on output 47.40% 52.04% 32.09% 
Based on inputs 22.33% 16.76% 25.90% 
Based on current farm characteristics 25.56% 7.49% 12.52% 
Decoupled Payments: 4.71% 23.71% 29.49% 
Based on historic farm characteristics, 
production not required 0.27% 19.00% 22.58% 
Based on non-commodity criteria 4.43% 4.71% 6.91% 
Notes: *In U.S. Millions; (OECD, 2008b) 
                                                        
1 Producer Support Estimate is “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and 
taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that 




 Table 2.2 illustrates the switch from coupled deficiency payments to decoupled 
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) introduced in 1996.  With the passing of the FAIR 
Act, decoupled payments given directly to farmers based on historical yields and acres 
planted became the standard form of income support for many commodity programs in 
the US.  Decoupled direct payments were continued in the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI), giving farmers the option to update their base acreage 
and yields.  Moreover, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (FCE) continued 
decoupled direct payments but gave farmers the option of foregoing a portion of their 
direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program payments 
providing participants with a revenue flow that is based on both national market price and 
state average yields.  In addition, FCE permitted farmers to adjust base acreage once 
again to allow for the addition of newly covered commodities.  A summary of the 
primary decoupled direct payments used in U.S. programs follows. 
Production Flexibility Contracts (1996 -2002) and  
Fixed Direct Payments (2002 -2012) 
The 1996 FAIR Act eliminated many supply controls on field crops and introduced 
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC).  Farms producing wheat, feed grains (corn, 
barley, sorghum, and oats), rice, and upland cotton were allowed a one-time enrollment 
for a seven-year contract where eligibility was dependent on participation in a production 
adjustment program between 1991 and 1995.2
ΨHi
  Payments were determined by the product 
of the specific payment rate αi for each crop i, historic base yield  for each crop i, and 
                                                        
2 The production adjustment program was from the 1990 Farm Bill. 
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= 0.85α iΨ i AiH . 
Producers were free to plant any amount of the base acres with any crop (with 
limitations on fruits, vegetables and specialty crops), allowing for more flexibility in the 
mix of commodities planted as well as the total acreage planted.  For example, a farm 
could receive a payment based on historic corn acreage but plant wheat and oats in the 
fields.  
In the 2002 FSRI Act, PFC were replaced with fixed direct payments (FDP) that 
worked much the same way.  Eligibility for FDP changed from a seven-year contract to 
an annual agreement.  Effective in 2009, the FSRI Act changed the calculation of 
payment acres from 85 percent of base acres in a selected commodity to 83.3 
percent.   Fixed direct payments also expanded the types of crops supported to include 
soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts4
Counter-Cyclical Payments (2002-2012) 
 (ERS, 2002; Young & Shields, 1996), creating the 
possibility for farmers to update base acreage and yield. 
 The 2002 FSRI Act introduced counter-cyclical payments (CCP) as another form 
of income support, replacing the Market Loss Assistance (MLA) Program5
                                                        
3 See Appendix A for full explanation of what Payment Acres and Payment Yields cover in each Farm Bill. 
 introduced in 
1998 as a supplement to the FAIR Act.  A decline in commodity prices and projected 
4 Special provisions are made concerning peanuts. 
5 Classification of MLA payments is disputed: Burfisher and Hopkins (2004) suggest MLA’s are tied to 
market price and therefore fully coupled and would be classified within the Amber Box, while Adams et al. 
(2001) analyze MLA payments side-by-side PFC payments as fully decoupled. 
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farm income in 1998 paired with reduced global demand for agricultural products due to 
the Asian economic crisis led to Congress creating an emergency assistance package of 
close to $3 billion to be paid directly to farmers (ERS, 2002).  Like PFC and fixed direct 
payments, CCP are based on historic, not current, production.  However, CCP are only 
instituted when the effective price is less than the target price set in the FSRI Act and 
therefore are only “partially” decoupled as CCP are still linked to current prices (ERS, 
2008). 
 Another difference between FSRI Act policies and previous policies is in the 
calculation of base acreage and yield.  The FSRI Act allowed farmers three options to 
calculate base yield and acreage used in the CCP and FDP payout rate (ERS, 2002).    
First, they could keep calculating base yield the same way as before.  Second, a farmer 
could update base yields used in the CCP payout calculation to the sum of program yields 
(set by FSRI Act) and 70 percent of the difference between current program yields and 
the farm’s average yield from 1998 to 2001:  
ΨH1 = ΨFSRI + 0.70 Ψ t − ΨF 98−01( ). 
Third, farmers had the option to update base yield to 93.5 percent of the average national 
yields between 1998 and 2001:  
ΨH 2 = 0.935ΨN 98−01 . 
Two additional ways to determine base acreage were also introduced through the 
CCP.  First, base acreage could be calculated as the sum of the total base acreage that 
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would have been used to calculate 2002 PFC payments plus average oilseed plantings 
between 1998 and 2001:6
AH1 = A98−01 + Α98−01oil
  
. 
Additionally, farmers could choose to update base acreage to include a four-year average 
of total acres planted and acres unable to be planted due to weather conditions between 
1998 and 2001 (ERS, 2002): 
AH 2 = A98−01 + Α98−01idle . 
Average Crop Revenue Election (2008-2012) 
The newest decoupled policy was introduced in the 2008 FCE Act.  Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) payments provide participants with a guaranteed revenue flow 
that is based on both national market price and state average yields.  Producers enrolled 
in ACRE must remain enrolled until 2012 and are not eligible for CCP.  Enrollment in 
ACRE also reduces all fixed direct payments to the farm by 20 percent.  The program 
covers an even greater number of commodities: wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, 
upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, peanuts, dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas, 
and large chickpeas. 
ACRE payments are contingent on national average market prices and planted 
yields within the state.  Farmers are given direct payments totaling 90 percent of the 
product of the five-year benchmark state yield and the two-year ACRE program 
guarantee price.  ACRE benchmark state yield is a commodity and state specific measure 
                                                        
6 This option applies unless base acres exceed available cropland.  Each producer must select one of the 
two options to apply to all covered commodities for both direct and counter-cyclical payments. 
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of the fitted average yield per planted acre; the ACRE program guarantee price is a 
national commodity specific two-year average market price (ERS, 2008).  If ACRE 
revenue for the state and farm is less than the program guarantee and the benchmark 
farm, participants receive a payment (ERS, 2008).  The ACRE program differs from 
previous support programs because the payments are based on moving averages of yields 
and prices, not a set historical time period as is seen with PFCs and FDPs.  Because 
producers base their decision to participate in ACRE on the historic and expected 
variability in prices, the program works as a partially decoupled policy similar to CCP.  
Both ACRE and CCP are viewed as insurance programs linked to price.  
Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating 
 With each new Farm Bill, changes in the way payment acres and payment yields 
are calculated permitted farmers to update their base acres and yields upon which 
payments are based.  For example, the 2002 Farm Bill added soybeans, other oilseeds and 
peanuts to the list of program crops.  Farmers that grew acreage of those crops were able 
to increase their payment, and base acres to include any soybeans, oilseeds, or peanuts 
planted during the base period.  Further updating was permitted in 2008 when pulse crops 
were added to program crops.  Updating can also occur with changes in how yield and 
acreage are calculated.  As discussed above, countercyclical payments have three 
alternative calculations of base yields and two calculations of base acreage.  If a farmer 
comes to expect updating or policy changes every seven to ten years, he or she may 
change his or her current production now to increase the payout in the future.  More 
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detail about how updating enables decoupled payments to distort production will be 
provided in subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 and 4). 
Degrees of Decoupled Payments 
Generally, decoupled payments can be defined as any measure of support that 
does not affect production decisions such that production at the farm level remains 
unchanged with or without the decoupled payment.  Coupled payments can then be 
defined as any measure of support that affects production decisions such that production 
at the farm level changes with the presence of the coupled payment.  Support programs, 
such as counter-cyclical payments and ACRE, that are linked to current commodity 
prices but not current production are identified as ‘partially’ decoupled because they are 
less distortive than programs linked to both price and production.  Support programs, 
such as fixed direct payments and production flexibility contracts, that are not linked to 
current prices or production are identified as ‘fully’ decoupled payments because, in 
theory, they do not distort production.7
The USDA defines decoupled direct payments as “lump-sum income transfers to 
farm operators that do not depend on current production, factor use, or commodity prices 
and for which eligibility is based on fixed, historical criteria” (Burfisher & Hopkins, 
2004).  Hennessey (1998) uses a more relaxed definition of the term decoupled in his 
research, allowing any lump-sum payment made independent of production to count as 
fully decoupled, including crop disaster payments and one-time crop insurance 
 
                                                        
7 The semantics behind the name may be interesting for readers, however the literature reviewed in the 
following chapter suggests that even ‘fully’ decoupled payments are not completely decoupled. 
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payments.  Other authors suggest that timing and expectations play an important role in 
whether or not a payment is decoupled.  Goodwin and Mishra (2006) argue that in order 
for a payment to be fully decoupled, it must only be a fixed and guaranteed lump-sum 
transfer to farms for a historic time period.  In this framework, the 2002 FSRI Act and the 
2008 FCE Act created payments that were only partially decoupled from production 
decisions because allowing farmers to update base acres and yields can ultimately change 
production decisions based on past experience and future expectations.  In the context of 
this thesis, decoupled payments will be defined following Goodwin and Mishra’s more 
strict definition. 
Agriculture and the Environment 
In the 1960s, public concern over the use of pesticides in agricultural practices 
and agricultural policies began to be examined within an environmental framework 
(Dixon, Dixon, & Miranowski, 1973; Rausser, 1992).  Although soil conservation is an 
environmental concern, it does not have the same widespread social concern as the use of 
carcinogenic pesticides.  During the 1960s, it became apparent that agricultural policies 
have implications not just for the producers and consumers of crops, but on the 
environment as well (Rausser, 1992).  The use of pesticides in agriculture remains a 
heated debate and many studies show that coupled price supports increase the amount of 
pesticides used for each commodity (Cowan & Gunby, 1996; Dixon, Dixon, & 
Miranowski, 1973; Johnson, Wolcott, & Aradhyula, 1990; Lichtenberg & Zilberman, 
1986; Rausser, 1992).  To compound this, only 15 percent of farms participating in 
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commodity programs (including all forms of decoupled direct payments) are also 
participating in conservation programs and almost half of all farms receiving commodity 
program payments do not receive any conservation payment (Claassen & Morehart, 
2006).  The recent movement towards decoupling farm support should reduce the 
motivation to overproduce, thus creating the positive yet unintended effect of decreasing 
the usage of fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals unless coupling occurs through 
the mechanisms discussed in detail in the next two chapters.  
Although income transfers via decoupled direct payments should not, in theory, 
affect marginal production decisions since farmers receive the market price for the last 
unit they produce, such a transfer may alter the decision to enter or exit the market or 
may influence an individual farmer’s risk preferences or alter access to credit or change a 
farmer’s expectations about future government agricultural support policies resulting in 
changes to farm household consumption and investment decisions (de Gorter, Just & 
Kropp, 2008; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Hennessy, 1998; C. E. Young & Westcott, 
2000).  Thus decoupled direct payments can ultimately lead to a change in aggregate 
production and/or a change in the types and quantities of inputs used in production, 
with possible environmental consequences (Adams et al., 2001; Orazem & Miranowski, 
1994; Wu, 1999).  
Summary 
The United States has a long history of supporting farmers, first through 
education and research, then beginning in the Great Depression with income supports via 
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coupled price supports, a practice that was continued in various forms until the 
introduction of decoupled payments in the 1996 FAIR Act.  Decoupled payments were 
introduced in the hopes of supporting farmer’s income directly, without creating 
production distortions.  Recent literature suggests that while in theory decoupled direct 
payments should not distort production, there are several mechanisms by which this 





Decoupled and partially decoupled support programs are far from the transparent 
policies suggested by the WTO’s classification scheme of amber, green and blue 
boxes.  Decoupled income transfers such as production flexibility contracts, 
countercyclical payments, and fixed direct payments were thought to not affect marginal 
production decisions because producers receive the market price for their last unit of 
production.  However, such a transfer may influence a farmer’s production decision via 
the coupling mechanisms discussed in this chapter.  These coupling mechanisms are 
likely to have an effect on farm household consumption and investment decisions, thus 
resulting in a change in aggregate production and/or a change in the types and quantities 
of inputs used in production, including fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals.   
 The literature on decoupled payments acknowledges several mechanisms by 
which decoupled payments can become ‘coupled’ to production, prices, or inputs.  First, 
risk averse producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects from 
expectations of continued payments in the future (Hennessy, 1998).  Second, in imperfect 
credit markets decoupled payments may ease constraints by increasing total wealth 
(Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).   Third, current production 
decisions may be influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, in particular 
after liberal updating was allowed in the 2002 Farm Bill (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010; 
Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008).  Fourth, input markets are affected through possible 
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changes in the allocation of labor and land, due to capitalization of decoupled payments 
in land values (Ahearn, El-Osta, & Dewbre, 2006; Kirwan, 2009).  Lastly, exit deterrence 
may result in fewer people leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed costs (Chau & de 
Gorter, 2005), declining average costs, or cross-subsidization (de Gorter, Just, & Kropp, 
2008). 
 This literature review begins with a summary of these studies and then focuses 
further on studies examining the effect of decoupled payments on input use, specifically, 
fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals. These inputs are particularly important to 
understand because of their dual role as production inputs and possible insurance against 
low yields (Rajsic, Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Roosen & Hennessy, 2003).  
Furthermore, if decoupled payments do distort production through increases in 
agricultural chemicals, there is potential for unintended environmental damage. 
Coupling Mechanisms of Decoupled Payments 
1. Insurance and Wealth Effects 
 Increases in income via decoupled payments may change a farmer’s risk tolerance 
by reducing uncertainty associated with fluctuating commodity prices (Hennessy, 1998; 
Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Sandmo, 1971).  Hennessy (1998) analyzes the insurance 
and wealth effects of decoupled and coupled payments to risk-averse farmers.  Through a 
mathematical framework, Hennessy first proposes three ways that both decoupled and 
coupled payments can be linked to a profit maximizing farmer’s optimal production 
decisions.  If wealth and/or insurance effects are present, a decoupled payment received 
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by a farmer under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) will lead to an increase in a 
choice variable if 1) the payment increases with the level of uncertainty 2) the risk averse 
producer decreases production under greater uncertainty, and 3) the payment increases at 
a decreasing rate with the level of uncertainty (this is the second order condition for the 
first premise).  
Hennessy then examines insurance effects alone for a farmer under constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and finds similar results, signifying that a decoupled 
payment can act as an income stabilizer if a payment increases at a decreasing rate with 
the level of uncertainty.  Conversely, a decoupled payment can create more income 
volatility if both the decoupled payment and the marginal increase in the payment 
increases with an increase in the level of uncertainty.  
In order to compare decoupled and coupled payments, Hennessy lastly proposes 
that under coupled payment plans, producers face a profit function that includes the 
expected coupled payment, creating a much larger and direct effect on production 
decisions.  In all three propositions, the payment creates an incentive for a risk averse 
producer to increase production when uncertainty increases by mitigating a part of 
uncertainty. 
To understand the magnitude of these three propositions, Hennessy simulates 
various coupled and decoupled payment options for a 400-acre corn farm in Iowa to 
determine how nitrogen levels (the selected choice variable) and yield (a measure of 
production) change with risk.  As expected, he finds that coupled payments lead to 
greater increases in yield and nitrogen use than do decoupled payments, with risk neutral 
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farmers increasing nitrogen use the most and farmers under DARA increasing their 
nitrogen use least.   Furthermore, although decoupled payments are less distortive than 
traditional coupled payments, they still increase input use and yield, signaling that these 
payments influence production decisions.  
Hennessy concludes that the insurance effects of program payments are found to 
have the largest impact on production, followed by coupling impacts and lastly wealth 
effects.  Under high CARA (with no wealth effect possible), adding a production 
flexibility contract (PFC)-style payment with a target price of $2.75 and yield of 120 
bushels per acre is shown to increase nitrogen use by 12 percent and yield by 2 to 3 
percent.  While controlling for insurance effects by creating an equivalent lump-sum 
payout of $27,943, adding the same payment under DARA only increases nitrogen use by 
1 percent.  The large insurance effect of decoupled payments may be exacerbated because 
many government programs are designed for markets with higher levels of risk (and 
therefore high insurance effects).8
 Changes in production associated with decoupled payments have generally been 
positive and small, but statistically significant (Adams et al., 2001; Coble, Miller, & 
Hudson, 2008; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Plantinga, 1996).  Adams et al. (2001) used 
ordinary least squares regression analysis to determine whether PFC and market loss 
assistance (MLA) payments increased land use (measured in total crop area) in eleven 
Midwestern states between 1997 and 2000.  The authors find that PFC and MLA 
payments do not have a significant relationship to land use.  They also find that if the 
  
                                                        
8 In fact, almost all government programs for agriculture require some form of crop insurance or a 
guarantee to not accept disaster support such as Market Loan Assistance. 
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payments increased by 10 percent, crop area planted would increase roughly by 0.3 
percent.  Contrary to previous studies, the researchers also find that when PFC and MLA 
payments are combined with other marketing loans, they have a statistically significant 
effect on total crop area, even though marketing loans themselves do not significantly 
impact crop area.  This contradiction may be due to the higher insurance effect found in 
MLA payments because they are linked to current prices.  The Adams et al. study may 
not fully capture farmers’ responses to changes in marketing loans and government 
payments due to the short time period analyzed (only four years).  Also, the study does 
not account for changes in crop mix, which would also have an effect on land use. 
2. Imperfect Credit Markets 
 Administering decoupled payments in imperfect credit markets can create a 
coupling mechanism by increasing the farmer’s total wealth and indirectly reducing 
constraints on credit.  Burfisher and Hopkins (2004) analyze the possible effects of 
decoupled payments using a computable general equilibrium model and find that given 
perfect markets (with access to credit, risk neutrality and no insurance effect), there 
would be no increase of aggregate farm investment or production.  However, if the credit 
market is not perfect, farm investment would only increase 0.2 percent and production 
would increase by even less.  Burfisher and Hopkins suggest that moving away from all 
coupled payments would help the US achieve more market-oriented policies.  
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 Goodwin and Mishra (2006) also look at credit constraints in a study of 
commercial farms in the Corn Belt9
 Goodwin and Mishra find the direct effect of PFC payments on corn and soybean 
acreage decisions to be statistically significant and small, with an additional $1.00 in 
payments increasing corn acreage by 0.92 acres and soybeans by 0.61 acres per 
farm.  The interaction terms are both statistically insignificant, indicating that PFC 
payments between 1998 and 2001 did not impact acreage decisions indirectly through 
credit constraints and risk preferences.  The authors note that their study did not find the 
“exact mechanism by which” PFC payments affect corn, soybean, and wheat acreage in 
 region.  Farm level data from the USDA’s 
Agricultural Resources and Management Survey (ARMS) allow the authors to create a 
more complete analysis than prior studies, although only four years were used (1998-
2001).  The authors estimate acreage equations for the three most abundant crops in the 
region, corn, soybean, and wheat, allowing them to examine changes not only in land use 
but overall crop mix as well.  Variables used include crop price, farm size, government 
payments per acre (PFC and MLA payments), input prices (fertilizer, gasoline, and 
wages), wealth, a debt to asset ratio to capture credit constraints, and an insurance 
expenditure to total expenditure ratio as a measure of a farmer’s level of risk 
aversion.  The farm-level acreage equations also include interaction variables that capture 
the indirect relationship between both PFC payments and risk and PFC payments and 
credit constraints.  
                                                        
9 The Corn Belt covers the USDA’s “Heartland” resource region, a homogenous group of counties in 
including most counties Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South 
Dakota (Heimlich, 2000). 
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the Corn Belt as their analysis does not examine the possibility of intensive changes in 
production practice, such as reducing or increasing fertilizer or chemical 
applications.  Furthermore, the study is limited to cross-sectional data that does not allow 
for comparisons of acreage decisions through time.  
3. Future Expectations of Updating 
 As explained in Chapter Two, the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills allow opportunities 
for farmers to update base acres and yields.  Farmers anticipating the possibility of 
updating might have taken advantage of updating by planting additional acreage of crops 
they would have otherwise not grown, to ensure that the historic base acres on which 
decoupled payments are based was as high as possible.  Farmer’s could also increase base 
yield by increasing the use of inputs like fertilizer.  A study by Coble, Miller and Hudson 
(2008) suggests that farmers face large uncertainty about future direct and counter-
cyclical payments: in a 2005 survey conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Survey (NASS), about 40 percent of respondents from Iowa and Mississippi expected 
base acreage and yield updating would be allowed in the next farm bill.  Furthermore, 10 
percent of farmers responded that they had previously increased acreage and/or inputs to 
‘build base’ in anticipation of the 2002 Farm Bill.     
 Bhaskar and Bhegin’s (2007) analysis of updating under uncertainty tries to 
quantify the extent that future expectations change risk averse farmer’s behavior.  They 
consider two possible base acreage options provided by the 2002 Farm Bill: 1) new base 
acreage must be a four-year average of total acres planted in 1998 to 2001 and 2) no base 
acreage updating.  Base yields were calculated to be 93.5 percent of 1998 to 2001 
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average national yields.10
 The farmer’s profit function is dependent on the per-period price of crops grown, 
total acreage and base acreage, yields, loan rate, government payments, and total 
costs.  Interestingly, the application of nitrogen as fertilizer appears in two parts of the 
model.  First, yield is a function of both nitrogen and time; second, total cost is a function 
of current acreage and nitrogen application.  Thus profit depends directly on price, 
acreage, and nitrogen.  Since the farmer’s expected utility depends on possible updating, 
a term is added to capture the possibility of future program income with no updating and 
with updating allowed for in the 2008 Farm Bill (2007-2011):   
  The authors then use a model where farmer’s maximize utility 
through current and future utility due to the connection created by expected future 
updating.  As this study is more recent than the ones described above, it uses current 
government payments: fixed direct payments (FDP) and counter cyclical payments 
(CCP).  Recall that both FDP and CCP are based on historic acreage and yield, however, 
CCP are brought about by low program crop prices (Chapter Two).  
γVB + 1− γ( )VNB . 
VB is the value of the payment to the farmer if updating is allowed and VNB is the value 
of the payment to the farmer if no updating is allowed in the 2008 Farm Bill.  The model 
also includes a subjective probability of updating (γ) between 0 and 1: if the farmer 
thinks there is a 100 percent chance that updating will occur, his subjective probability is 
1; if the farmer thinks there is a zero percent chance that updating will occur, γ will be 
                                                        
10 See Appendix A for other updating options available in the 2002 Farm Bill. 
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zero.  The larger γ, the greater the link between current  (2003-2006) acreage and input 
decisions and future program crop payments.   
 Bhaskar and Bhegin use a stochastic dynamic programming approach to solve the 
two utility maximization problems (one with updating and one without) using present 
value estimation to derive optimal nitrogen and acreage decisions under varying degrees 
of certainty in updating.  Optimal nitrogen application data from 1979-2003 is obtained 
from an experimental farm in Iowa that applies four different amounts of nitrogen to 
fields: 0, 80, 160 and 240 pounds per acre.  The optimal nitrogen application data is used 
to estimate the parameters of optimal acreage for 16 states.  The authors find that both 
average yield and average acreage increased as farmers become more certain about future 
updating (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010). 
 When farmers were certain that updating is allowed, average acreage increases by 
4.74 percent, compared to 3.04 percent for a 50 percent certainty that future updating will 
be allowed.  Changes in yield were positive but much smaller, with a 0.05 percent change 
for 100 percent certainty of updating.  Bhaskar and Bhegin suggest that this is because 
increasing nitrogen application (which is how they capture yield) has decreasing marginal 
returns so increasing yield is expensive.  Combining these results, the average increase in 
output across all 16 states is 4.8 percent with full certainty of updating.  
 The study shows that allowing updating has a positive effect on acreage decisions 
and a smaller but positive effect on nitrogen use, especially if farmers are given enough 
time to change production decisions before the updating goes into effect.  However, 
Bhaskar and Bhegin’s model may have some over-generalizations.  First, the research 
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includes farms with only one crop, not allowing farmers to change crop mix instead of 
acreage allocation.  Also, fertilizer use is likely to be different across crops and across 
states, so using nitrogen application as a strict gauge of changes in yield may lead to 
under- or over- estimates. 
4. Input Markets 
 Other production decisions can be affected by decoupled payments as well, 
including labor and land allocations.  Farmers have three ways to allocate their own 
labor: working on the farm, working off the farm, or leisure.  As payments to farms 
increase, hours spent working off the farm are exchanged for farm work  (El-Osta, 
Mishra, & Ahearn, 2004).  This is true for both coupled and decoupled payments, 
including the 1996 FSRI’s PFC payments (El-Osta, Mishra, & Ahearn, 2004). 
 Allocations of land can also be impacted by government payments.  Because the 
supply of land is inelastic and supply of inputs is assumed to be perfectly elastic at the 
individual farm level, landowners are presumed to capture some of the benefits of 
government payments in the value of the land, a process called capitalization.  Therefore, 
farmers renting land would not see government payments as an increase in wealth 
because they would not completely capture those payments (Kirwan, 2009).  Government 
payments would create an incentive for landowners to keep land in agricultural use rather 
than forfeit this stream of income.   However, 100 percent capitalization is unlikely.  
Kirwan (2009) suggests that due to lack of competition in the market for farmland as well 
as consolidation within the agriculture sector, 25 percent of government payments pass to 
the landlord; roughly 75 percent remains with the tenant.  Other research has shown that 
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the share of each dollar of direct payments received by farm operators that is passed 
through to the landlord in the form of higher rental rates can be as high as 94 percent 
(Lence & Mishra, 2003; Rosine & Helmberger, 1974).  It is important to keep in mind 
that although all government payments are made to the farm operator, they may not be 
completely retained by him or her; the larger the proportion of decoupled payments 
retained by the farm operator, the greater the impact of the five coupling mechanisms 
described in this section (Abler & Blandford, 2005).   
5. Exit Deterrence 
 The final coupling mechanism discussed focuses on the impact of government 
payments on the producer’s decision to leave the farming industry.  Farmers may use 
decoupled payments to cover costs for which they would otherwise be unable to pay for, 
thus creating a disincentive to leave the market (Chau & de Gorter, 2005; de Gorter, Just, 
Kropp, 2008).  
 Chau and de Gorter (2005) study the impact of loan deficiency payments and 
PFCs on U.S. wheat production, finding that when either government payment covers 
fixed costs, low profit firms are able to stay in the market longer than they would have 
without the payments, increasing total aggregate production.  The impact to aggregate 
production is relatively small due to the fact that most marginal farms are not producing 
that much wheat, so their output is a rather small percent of the total. 
 In a study on cross-subsidization, de Gorter, Just and Kropp (2008) examine the 
U.S. dairy industry’s reaction to the 2002 FSRI’s Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
(MILC).  This program pays a countercyclical payment to dairy farmers when the price 
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of milk falls below a specified target price.  However, only the first 2.4 million pounds of 
milk per farm per year is eligible to receive the payment (de Gorter, Just, & Kropp 
2008).  The authors find that both theoretically and empirically infra-marginal payments 
such as the MILC program can increase output as much or more than the equivalent 
coupled subsidy in both the short run and the long run due to exit deterrence and cross-
subsidization. 
Input Use and Decoupled Payments 
 The empirical and theoretical models discussed above find that decoupled 
payments have minor effects on total output but greater effects on input use and crop 
mix.  Decoupled payments have also been found to change input decisions with possible 
environmental consequences (Adams et al., 2001; Orazem & Miranowski, 1994; Wu, 
1999).  Agricultural inputs such as pesticides, fertilizers, and herbicides can lead to 
environmental pollution.  Since not all commodities require equal amounts of inputs, any 
agricultural policy’s effect on crop mix should be analyzed if minimizing environmental 
damage is important.11
 Due to a lack of panel data, few studies have been conducted examining the 
change in crop mix due to agricultural policy.  Considering the insurance effect created 
by decoupled payments (Hennessy 1998), a risk averse farmer receiving decoupled 
  For example, production of corn and soybeans is known to use 
more pesticides and fertilizers than wheat.  Therefore, any shift towards corn or soybean 
production in favor of wheat will increase total agricultural chemical use on the farm.     
                                                        
11 Since the US has many conservation policies, it is assumed that environmental quality is valued. 
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payments will begin planting riskier but more profitable crops.  This phenomenon, called 
moral hazard, can change the farm’s cropping patterns and crop mix.  For example, 
“farmers who purchase crop insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn” (Wu, 
1999), leading to negative impacts on environmental quality as corn requires more 
fertilizer and pesticides than hay (Claassen & Morehart, 2006; Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 
1993; Monge-Arino, 2007; Plantinga, 1996; Serra et al., 2005; Wu, 1999).   
 Plantinga (1996) examines a case of moral hazard in dairy production, focusing 
on possible gains in environmental quality from reducing milk price supports in 
southwestern Wisconsin.  This study steers away from field commodities such as corn 
and wheat to focus on the equally important dairy sector.  The author finds that reducing 
price supports would decrease land allocated to dairy production and increase total 
forested acres.  Plantinga estimates environmental quality by measuring water quality and 
soil erosion in the study area and finds that lower support-prices are associated with a 
reduction in the use of marginal land.  Since erosion is more common on marginal low-
quality land, Plantinga’s study finds that environmental quality can increase as farmers 
are given an incentive to decrease milk production and increase forestry production.   
A welfare analysis suggests that if the ratio of timber-to-milk prices increased 10 
percent (effectively a $1.18 in average milk price), consumer surplus would increase by 
$8.2 to $13.3 million.  While Plantinga’s study is thorough, it does not consider the 
different possibilities of risk averse producers, so his results must be considered in a 
limited framework.  Furthermore, he analyzes a reduction in total price supports, not a 
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change from coupled to decoupled payments seen in current policy (Leathers & Quiggin, 
1991). 
Fertilizer and Other Agricultural Chemicals:  
Risk Reducing or Risk Increasing Inputs? 
The majority of studies on the effect of decoupled payments on the use of 
agricultural chemicals do not focus on the environmental implications of their findings.  
Instead, the use of agricultural chemical inputs is looked at in the context of a farmer’s 
level of risk aversion  (Hennessy, 1998; Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, 
Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992; Roosen & Hennessy, 2003).   
There is much debate on whether fertilizers and agricultural chemicals such as 
pesticides are risk reducing or risk increasing inputs from the farmer’s standpoint.  A 
farmer will increase consumption of inputs they view as risk reducing if they are risk 
averse: for example, a farmer may add more than the recommended amount of nitrogen if 
he thinks it will minimize the level of risk incurred at harvest.12
An input reduces risk if it adds more to output in bad states of nature than 
in good states of nature, since this makes output (and profit) in each state of 
nature more uniform and decreases yield variability.  An input increases 
risk if it adds relatively more to output in good states than in bad ones, 
since that increases the discrepancy among states.  In regions and/or crops 
where high pest infestations occur primarily when crop growth conditions 
are good, pesticides work by increasing output in good states of nature and 
are thus likely to be risk increasing.  
  On the other hand, if a 
risk averse farmer views fertilizer as risk increasing, he may under-apply fertilizer to 
reduce risk.  Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) explain  
                                                        
12 Rajsic, Weersink, and Gandorfer (2009) suggest that farmers may view fertilizer as “cheap insurance.”   
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It is important to remember two things: first, whether or not an input is actually 
risk reducing or increasing is less important than the farmer’s level of risk aversion 
because this will determine whether he or she applies less than or more than the 
recommended amount.  If a risk loving farmer believes that fertilizer is a risk reducing 
input, he will apply less fertilizer per acre than his risk averse neighbor.  Second, because 
of all agricultural chemicals’ dual roles as production inputs and possible risk mitigators 
(or risk enhancer), it is important to understand how they interact with government 
payments, particularly those requiring some level of crop insurance for eligibility.  
Summary 
 Decoupled direct payments have been shown to distort production relative to no 
policy being in place through at least five “coupling” mechanisms: insurance and wealth 
effects, credit constraints, expectations of policy updating, changes in the allocation of 
labor and land, and exit deterrence.  Furthermore, production distortions can change input 
use on the farm directly or indirectly through changes in crop mix or acreage allocation.  
If production distortions lead to increases in the use of other agricultural chemicals, the 
rural environment may be negatively affected by unintended negative externalities.  
Additionally, the impact on the use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals may be even 
more significant because of their dual role as inputs and possible insurance against low 
yields. 
 The next chapter will discuss in depth the farmer’s expected utility maximization 
problem, focusing on how inputs and acreage allocation may change with coupled and 
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decoupled government payments, as well as how expectations about updating can affect 




The previous chapter illustrates the complex nature of the on-farm decision-
making process farmers go through.  This chapter will show that both input decisions 
(intensive margin) and acreage allocation (extensive margin) can change with a change in 
decoupled payments by comparing four potential expected utility maximization models: 
1) a model without any government payments, 2) a model with only fully coupled price 
supports, 3) a model with decoupled payments and no updating, and lastly 4) a model 
with decoupled payments and updating possible.  To more closely represent the real-
world scenario, the final model combines fully coupled price supports, decoupled 
payments, and updating.   
Profit Maximization without Government Payments 
 First, it is assumed that all farmers maximize their expected utility of wealth, 
including farm profits and off-farm income.  Furthermore, farmers will allocate both 
acreage and other inputs in order to maximize profit.  Equation (4.1) illustrates the 
expected utility maximization problem of a typical farmer where both acreage A and 
quantity of inputs X are choice variables.  Let E be the expectation operator over the 
random variables, output prices and yields, and U ⋅( ) be a concave continuously 
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function suggesting farmers are risk 
averse.   
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(4.1) V = Max










where  gt (⋅) = π t
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s.t.   Ψ it φAit ≤ F Xijt , Ait ,εit( )  




 The function gt ⋅( )is the sum of the profit function π tnogov ⋅( ), income from off-farm 
activities at time t, Iit, and a measure of initial wealth in time t-1, Wt-1.  The discount 
factor is δ t .  Profit is specified as the difference of costs and revenue.  Revenue is the 
summation of the product of price, yield, and acres planted: the price Pit of the ith crop at 
time t, yield per acre Ψit of crop i at time t subject to land quality φ, and acres planted Ait 
of the ith crop at time t. 
 Costs are a summation of fixed and variable costs associated with each crop i.  
The cost of input j associated with the ith crop at time t is the product of ω ijt , the unit cost 
of input j, and Xijt, the amount of input j associated with ith crop at time t.  Let rit be the 
per-acre cost of the land input associated with the ith crop at time t.  Thus, for a tenant 
farmer renting or leasing land, rit is the rental rate of land for the ith crop at time t; for a 
owner, rit is the opportunity cost associated with using the acreage for the next best use.  
Cit are fixed costs associated with the ith crop at time t and are a function of production 
decisions in the previous time period, meaning that acreage decisions are inter-temporal.  
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The model has two constraints: first, the farmer is constrained by the technology 
he employs.  Output Ψ it φAit  is a function of all inputs Xijt, acres planted Ait, and a 
stochastic element εit covering exogenous variants such as weather.  Output is constrained 
by the farmer’s production function.  Second, it is possible to optimize profit by having 
idle acreage Aidle.  Thus, if both harvested acreage and idle acreage are be included in the 
profit maximization model, then the constraint binds.  As time is an element of the model, 
acreage planted (At) is not fixed, and At-1 can be greater than, equal to, or less than current 
acreage as farmers buy, rent, or lease more land: At ≠ At−1∑∑ . 
Production decisions are made with output price and yield uncertainty.  Xijt and Ait 
are choice variables and all other variable are exogenous.  Costs from inputs are assumed 
known when acreage decisions are made because most costs are sustained at planting.  
Thus, within the profit function, uncertainty lies within revenue, not costs.  Hence, yield 
and output price are treated as random variables.   
First Order Conditions without Government Payments 
Without loss of generality, Equations (4.2) and (4.3) below illustrate the necessary 
first order conditions corresponding to the farmer’s utility maximization problem 
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 = 0 . 
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 Equation (4.2) illustrates the standard profit maximizing condition where the 
input’s value of its respective marginal product is equal to its own input price, ω ijt , for 
each time t, crop i and input j.  Equation (4.3) expresses the same is true of acreage; the 
value of the marginal product is equal to the rental rate rit, for each time t and crop i.  
However, there is an additional term for time period t-1, because, acreage decisions are 
inter-temporal.  For each first order condition, changes in output and input prices will 
change inputs and acreage.  Equations (4.1) – (4.3) will be used as a baseline to compare 
the next three models.  
Profit Maximization with Price Supports 
Now consider price supports PSit, a form of fully coupled government payments 
to farmers.  PSit is the sum of all per-unit subsidies and deficiency payments at price Pit.  
For example, farmers planting a specific commodity may receive a deficiency payment 
contingent to the set target price per commodity and the quantity produced.  Equation 
(4.4) is the farmer’s expected utility maximization problem with price supports:  
(4.4) V = Max










where gt (⋅) = π t
cpld (⋅) + It +Wt−1  
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s.t.   Ψ it φAit ≤ F Xijt , Ait ,εit( )  
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The profit function π changes to include the additional term PSit as a function of quantity 
produced Ψ it φAit .  Also, the introduction of government payments into the expected 
utility function adds uncertainty about policy changes.  Therefore, there is now 
uncertainty regarding price, yield, and policy. 
First Order Conditions with Price Supports 
 Because price supports depend on current prices and current production, PSit is 
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 = 0 . 
Acreage and input decisions depend not only on price and production, but the 
government issued price support as well.  The first order conditions for truly decoupled 
payments will be shown to be the same as those in Equation (4.2) and (4.3) and hence do 
not distort production.   
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct Payments 
 In theory, fully decoupled government payments should not change the profit 
maximizing optimal allocation of choice variables acreage A and inputs X.  When the 
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term for decoupled direct payments DPt is added to the profit function of Equation (4.1), 
the following model is given. 
(4.7) V = Max










where gt (⋅) = π t
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s.t. Ψ it φAit ≤ F Xijt , Ait ,εit( )  





Fully decoupled payments (e.g., fixed direct payments, production flexibility contracts) 
are represented by equation DPt ⋅( )defined as a summation over crop i and are a function 
of an α percentage of S payment per crop, historic yield ΨH per crop i, and base acres Bt 
for each crop i.  For example, production flexibility contracts introduced in the 1996 
Farm Bill calculated historic yield as an average of 1991-1994 base years, therefore 
farmers lacked ability to change production practices in order to manipulate the 
calculation of historic yield.  Historic yield is a function of the production function in a 
historic time period H and base acres are a function of historic acreage AH.  Thus, 
decoupled direct payments are not a function of current prices, production, or inputs.  
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Within the DP function, the only variables that vary in time t relate to the amount of 
support α itSit  each farmer receives, which depends on the policy in place at that time.   
First Order Conditions with Decoupled Direct Payments 
 As mentioned before, fully decoupled payments do not change the optimal 
allocation of inputs and acreage relative to no government payments, as seen in the first 
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 = 0 . 
 Because the policy is enacted after farmers have already made decisions in the 
historic time period H, Equations (4.8) and (4.9) are identical to Equations (4.2) and (4.3) 
when farmers receive no government payments.  Thus, if decoupled direct payments are 
fully decoupled, there will be no production distortion due to the government payments, 
unlike coupled payments.  Lastly, an additional term is added to allow for farmer’s 
expectations of updating of base acres and yields as well as updating due to changes in 
government policies, a potential coupling mechanism reviewed in Chapter Three. 
Profit Maximization with Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating 
 The literature reviewed in previous chapters also suggests that uncertainty about 
changes in future decoupled payments impacts a farmer’s decisions today (Bhaskar & 
Beghin, 2010; Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008).  Borrowing a term from Bhaskar and 
 44 
Beghin (2010) that allows for expected updating, the farmer’s utility maximization 
problem can be rewritten as 
 (4.10) V = Max










where g(⋅) = π t
dp (⋅) + It +Wt−1  
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 ht (⋅) = γVB + 1− γ( )VNB  
s.t. Ψ it φAit ≤ F Xijt , Ait ,εit( )  






γ = 0,1[ ]. 
The function ht ⋅( )  introduces a term from Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) that allows for the 
future policy benefits to depend on whether or not updating actually occurs and accounts 
for the farmer’s expectation of updating occurring.  Let γ be the farmer’s subjective 
probability of future base and/or yield updating.  If γ = 0 , a farmer does not expect 
updating will be allowed in future policies.  If γ = 1, a farmer is 100 percent certain that 
base updating will be allowed in future farm policies.  The function ht ⋅( )  is discounted 
using the discount factor δ t̂ , where t̂ corresponds to the time period in which the future 
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payment benefits are realized.  VB is defined as the value of the payment if updating 
occurs, and VNB is the value of the payment if updating does not occur.  If no updating is 
the true state of the world, then VNB is awarded.  Conversely, if updating is the true state 
of the world, then VB is awarded. 
First Order Conditions with Decoupled Direct Payments and Updating 
Without loss of generality, equations (4.11) and (4.12) below illustrates the 
necessary first order conditions corresponding to the farmer’s utility maximization 
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Equation (4.11) consists of two parts: the first term is the standard profit maximizing 
condition where the value of the marginal product is equal to the input price, ωijt.  The 
second term is due to updating. Note that the two terms have different discount factors 
due to the fact that the farmer receives part of the benefit in time t and part of the benefits 
in time t̂ . Equation (4.12) expresses the same is true of acreage: the value of the 
marginal product is equal to the rental rate rit, for each time t and crop i plus an additional 
term included due to updating.  However, there is an additional term for time period t-1, 
because, as previously mentioned, acreage decisions are inter-temporal. 
 46 
 If farmers have a non-zero subjective probability of updating, there is a 
connection between decoupled payments and input use.    For each first order condition, 
the larger γ, the greater the link between current acreage and input decisions and future 
program crop payments.  If γ = 0 , then the term included for expectations of updating 
becomes zero and decoupled payments are not coupled to production through 
expectations of updating.  If γ ∈ 0,1( ], the expectations of updating act as a coupling 
mechanism between decoupled direct payments and production thus leading to current 
production distortions.  Based on findings of Coble, Miller, and Hudson  (2008),13
γ > 0
 it is 
expected that will be true for some, but not all farmers.  The first order conditions 
allow decoupled payments to impact production decisions through increased acreage 
(extensive margin), via changing the mix of crops, or changing other input use to result in 
higher yields (intensive margin). 
 Updating was allowed twice since the introduction of decoupled payments in 
1996.  The 2002 FSRI Act introduced two new types of decoupled direct payment (fixed 
direct payments and counter-cyclical payments) that effectively changed the way base 
acres and yield were determined as well as expanded the number of program crops 
eligible for program benefits allowing farmers to reallocate their base acres.14
 The FCE Act of 2008 created another way in which updating to base acres and 
yield may occur.  The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program introduced in 
   
                                                        
13 In a 2005 survey conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Survey (NASS), 38 to 42 percent of 
respondents from Iowa and Mississippi expected base acreage and yield updating would be allowed in the 
2008 Farm Bill. 
14 See Appendix A for specific information on changes to program yields and acres. 
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2008 set historic yield to an Olympic moving average, meaning that each year the historic 
period H changes.  This policy may implicitly create a link between current acreage and 
input decisions and future program crop payments.  For completion, the following model 
combines fully coupled, decoupled, and other lump sum government payments that do 
not effect production. 
Profit Maximization with All Government Payments and Updating 
 Combining the elements of Equations (4.4), (4.7), and (4.10) and adding an 
additional term Gt for other lump sum government payments produces the following 
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 γ = 0,1[ ]. 
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The profit function now includes price supports PSit, decoupled direct payments DPt, and 
lump sum payments Gt, which can include conservation payments such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program or Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP).  It 
is evident that although Gt increase total expected utility, it does not depend directly on 
the choice variables acreage Ait and inputs Xijt.  Inclusion of ht ⋅( )  allows for the 
possibility of updating.    
First Order Conditions with All Government Payments and Updating 
 Equations (4.14) and (4.15) are the first order conditions.  Note that the term PSit 
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 = 0  




Government payments Gt are not included in either first order condition, illustrating that 
they do not influence production decisions.  As in Equation (4.10) and (4.13), the larger 
γ, the greater the link between current acreage and input decisions and future program 
crop payments.  If γ = 0 then Equations (4.14) and (4.15) will be equivalent to Equations 
(4.5) and (4.6), the optimal allocations of acreage and inputs with price supports. 
Summary 
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   This chapter examines the role of government payments and expectations of 
updating within five potential expected utility maximization problems by illustrating how 
coupled and decoupled payments can affect the farmer’s optimal allocation of acreage 
and inputs.    Although the equations presented in Chapter Four do not capture all five 
coupling mechanisms discussed in the previous chapter, the equations capture three key 
aspects of the literature reviewed.  Production distortions can be calculated at the 
extensive margin through changes in total acreage, the intensive margin through changes 
in the amounts of inputs used, and through changes in crop mix.   
 Truly decoupled direct payments do not affect a farmer’s optimal allocation of 
acreage or inputs as the payments are based on historic, not current, production.  
However, if a farmer expects updating to occur, either through government policy 
changes or the implicit design of the policy itself (in the case of ACRE), he or she may 
alter current farm production decisions in order to optimize future profits.  The magnitude 
of the effects of decoupled direct payments on input use, like fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemicals, depends on the discount rate δ , the subjective probability of 
updating (γ ), and the payout rate of decoupled farm subsidies (α itSit ) relative to the size 
of coupled price supports (PSit).  For example, if a farmer has a low discount factor, he is 
willing to allocate more resources to the future and may increase planting today to 
increase base acres and yields to reap future benefits.  A farmer with a high discount 
factor may be less willing to change current production decisions to obtain future 
benefits. 
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 The following chapters use weighted ordinary least squares regression to test the 
following hypothesis: there exists a positive and significant relationship between both 
coupled government payments and decoupled direct payments and the use of agricultural 
chemicals.  Although the relationship between both coupled government payments and 
decoupled direct payments and agricultural chemical use is expected to be positive, the 
magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments may be greater than or less than the 
effect of coupled government payments depending on the size of coupled price supports 
(PSit) and decoupled farm subsidies (α itSit ), the subjective probability of updating (γ ), 




 The objective of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between both coupled and decoupled direct government payments 
and the use of agricultural chemicals.  The magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct 
payments relative to coupled government payments depends on the size of coupled price 
supports (PSit) and decoupled farm subsidies (α itSit ), the subjective probability of 
updating (γ ), and the discount rate δ .  Additionally, structural breaks are expected 
corresponding to the timing of policy changes.  Weighted ordinary least squares 
regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis. 
Data 
 Cross-sectional data collected annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) is used in the analysis.  From 1984 to 1995 Farm Cost and Returns Surveys 
(FCRS) were collected from a representative sampling of farmers; in 1996 these surveys 
were replaced with Agricultural Resources and Management Survey (ARMS) 
questionnaires.  In order to identify changes in the use of fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals due to the initial implementation of decoupled direct payments in 1996 with 
the passing of the FAIR Act and/or policy changes in 2002 (FSRI) and 2008 (FCE), data 
from 1991 to 2008 is analyzed.  FCRS was collected annually from farmers and was 
comprised of questions relating to farm-level expenditures and returns while other 
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surveys were used to gather information about cropping practices and input use on a 
field-level.  In 1996, ARMS surveys integrated FCRS and the other surveys into one 
multi-phase, stratified, and probability-weighted dataset (Dubman, 2000).  Farmers 
selected to participate in answering the ARMS surveys are asked questions regarding 
both the farm business and household.  Participation is not mandated and farmers do not 
participate year after year. 
 ARMS data is collected in three phases: in Phase I, farmers are asked questions 
concerning what commodities have been planted that year.  This phase occurs in the 
summer months and acts as a screening process for Phase II and III.  Phase II is 
conducted in the fall and winter and asks randomly selected farmers from Phase I 
questions pertaining to cropping and management practices, production inputs, and 
commodity specific production costs.  Phase II data is collected at the field level and 
focuses on a specific crop, but not all commodities are surveyed every year.  Lastly, 
Phase III data is collected in the spring of the following year from a representative 
sample of farmers, including some who have already participated in Phase II.  Phase III 
data is collected at the farm-level and includes questions regarding farm business and 
household finances and farm management practices, including operating expenses such 
as fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals.  The number of farms surveyed during the 
Phase III process exceeds the number of farms surveyed during the Phase II process.   
FCRS and Phase III ARMS data is used in this thesis.  This data was selected 
because it contains information on decoupled payments, value of production, output, 
input expenses, and other farm and farmer characteristics at the farm-level.  ARMS and 
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FCRS data are also beneficial because of the known sampling weights.  Each observation 
is then given a weight reflecting the probability of being selected; therefore, population 
estimates can be constructed using a much smaller sample size than would otherwise be 
required.  The weights (or expansion factors) change each year to reflect changes in the 
population as a whole (Dubman, 2000).  All results are obtained using the appropriate 
weights. 
Study Observations 
 Because only farmers with historic plantings of the eleven program crops receive 
decoupled direct payments,15
 The U.S. farming sector is made up of many very diverse geographic regions: 
farming conditions in California are very different than farming conditions in Kansas.  
 the analysis is limited to farmers with more than 50 percent 
of their total value of production coming from program crop commodities.  This also 
eliminates livestock farms.  Therefore, any farmer with more than half of the total value 
of production coming from the following commodities is included in the analysis: general 
cash grain, wheat, corn, soybean, sorghum, rice, cotton, peanut, and other.  General cash 
grain crops refer to farms that are not specializing in a specific crop, but the sum of 
barley, corn, oats, rice, sorghum, soybean and wheat makes up at least half of all sales 
revenue.  Oilseeds and pulse crops (e.g., lentils, large chick peas, and small chick peas) 
are categorized under ‘other.’ 
                                                        
15 As of 2008, program crops include barley, corn, cotton, oats, oilseeds, peanuts, pulse crops, rice, 
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. 
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The USDA created nine ‘farm resource regions’16
 Thus, this analysis focuses on only the Heartland region.  The Heartland spreads 
across 543 counties in nine states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota.  However, only three states are wholly 
contained in the Heartland: Indiana, Illinois and Iowa.  The other six states only have 
some counties included in the Heartland, while the other parts of the state are categorized 
in different resource regions.  For example, it appears that all but the southernmost 
counties of Missouri are in the Heartland; the southern border with Arkansas is 
categorized as Eastern Uplands.  Since the current regional classifications were not 
developed until 1995, this analysis focuses on an extended Heartland region 
encompassing all counties located in the nine states listed above.  The Heartland region 
was chosen for several reasons.  First, the Heartland boasts the largest concentration of 
 in 1995 to help group farmland into 
more homogenous production zones based on geographic similarities, replacing the ten 
‘production regions’ previously used to classify farmland in the US.  These early 
production regions followed state boundaries, “necessarily group[ing] unlike areas 
together because a single State often encompasses different soils and typography” 
(Heimlich, 2000).  For example, prior to 1995, the Appalachian production region 
grouped Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina together 
because of geographic proximity.  However, those five states do not share similar 
production practices due to difference in soil, climate, and land use across the states; 
current resource regions designate these states to five different regions.   
                                                        
16 The nine regions are: Basin and Range, Northern Great Plains, Heartland, Northern Crescent, Eastern 
Uplands, Southern Seaboard, Mississippi Portal, Prairie Gateway, and the Fruitful Rim (Heimlich, 2000) 
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cropland (27 percent of the nation’s cropland) and crop value (23 percent) (Heimlich, 
2000).  Second, all but one program crop, peanuts, is grown there, thus farmers in this 
region face growing conditions that enable them to change their crop mix in order to 
maximize profits. 
 The analysis is also limited to include only farms where the primary operator 
claims their occupation as farm work.  Farmers that have other sources of income and are 
farming as a hobby or in retirement might engage in a different production decision-
making process.  Lastly, the analysis is restricted to only include farms with total acres 
operated greater than zero.17
Creating Weighted Average Costs  
  It seems counterintuitive to report negative acres operated 
on a farm, however, land owners may rent or lease farm acres to other farmers through a 
sharecropping or rental agreement; this land is then deducted from the total number of 
acres owned by the primary operator, rented from others, or leased from others (ERS, 
2003).  Negative total acres operated would therefore suggest that more land was being 
rented out or leased to other producers than operated by the primary operator.  In that 
regard, more income may come from renting land than actual production, so farms with 
negative operating acres are not included in the analysis.     
 One clear way that fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use is affected is 
through changes in the prices of these two groups of inputs.  Phase III data only asks 
about the total dollar amount spent on fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, not the 
                                                        
17 This limitation of the dataset is particularly important as almost all variables are adjusted with respect to 
total acres operated: having negative acres operated would change the sign of independent and dependent 
variables. 
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prices paid.  Phase II data, however, does ask farmers about the per acre cost of fertilizer 
and other agricultural chemicals for a given commodity.  Recall that Phase II data is 
collected annually, but not for all crops.  Table 5.1 shows that from 1991 to 2008, each 
program crop nationwide has been surveyed only two to four times.  Additionally, Phase 
II data is not collected at all for oilseeds, pulse crops, or peanuts. 
Table 5.1.  National Commodity 
Survey Years, 1991 – 2008 
Barley 1992 2003     
Corn 1991 1996 2001 2005 
Cotton 1991 1997 2003 2007 
Oats 1994 2005     
Rice 1992 2000 2006   
Sorghum 1995 2003    
Soybeans 1996 2002 2006  
Wheat 1994 1998 2004  
Source: ERS 2009 
 The Economic Research Service division of the USDA aggregates cost data from 
Phase II ARMS data and FCRS data prior to 1996 in a Cost and Returns Report estimated 
at a regional level.  Before 1996, Cost and Return regions change annually depending on 
the number of farms in each state producing the surveyed crop.  Prior to 1996, the region 
that best overlaps states in the extended Heartland region is the North Central region.  
However, aggregate prices are only calculated in that region for corn, wheat, oats, and 
soybeans.   
 The Heartland resource region average fertilizer and other agricultural chemical 
costs per acre are reported for these seven crops: barley, corn, cotton, oats, sorghum, 
soybeans, and wheat.  For this research, Cost and Returns Reports from the Heartland 
resource region are used after 1996 and from the North Central region for years 1991 
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through 1995.  Table 5.2 summarizes the states included in the Cost and Return reports 
used to create commodity specific regional prices of fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals. 
Table 5.2. Commodities Surveyed in the North Central and 
Heartland Regions, 1991 – 2008 
 1991-1995  1996-2008 
Barley -  Heartland 
Corn Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and 
Wisconsin 
 Heartland 
Cotton -  Heartland 
Oats Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin 
 Heartland 
Rice -  - 
Sorghum -  Heartland 
Soybeans Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and 
Wisconsin 
 Heartland 
Wheat Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio 
and Michigan 
 Heartland 
Source: ERS 2009.  Notes: The Heartland includes 543 counties in nine states: Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota.   
 ERS creates annual estimates for the years not surveyed by using price indices 
and USDA crop production and price statistics from other sources to better reflect year-
to-year changes.  Even so, technological changes or changes in survey techniques leave 
gaps in annual estimates for input costs (ERS, 2009).  From the combined North Central 
and Heartland data, pricing information is missing for barley (1991-2002), cotton (1991-
1996), sorghum (1991-1994), and soybeans (1997-2001).  In the years missing, a 6 year 
adjusted price average is calculated in place of the ERS estimated price. 
 The commodity specific average fertilizer and other agricultural chemical costs 
per acre are used to create a farm-level weighted average cost of fertilizer (WACF) and a 
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farm-level weighted average cost of agricultural chemicals (WACAC) for each far in the 
sample:  








∑   










In the first equation, Pit
F  is the per acre cost of fertilizer for commodity i in time t and is 
multiplied by the ratio of acres harvested of commodity i in time t (Ait) to total acres 
harvested of the seven program crops with fertilizer price information in time t (ATt).  
Equation (5.2) is identical to Equation (5.1) except Pit
AC , the per acre cost of agricultural 
chemicals for commodity i in time t replaces Pit
F .  All Pit
F  and Pit
AC  are adjusted using the 
producer price index for pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical 
manufacturing18
Model 
 to account for inflation and other year-to-year changes.  WACF and 
WACAC are used in the regression equations as a measure of prices for fertilizer and 
other agricultural chemicals, respectively . 
Variables 
 Given the hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between agricultural 
chemical use and government payments (both coupled and decoupled), the effects of 
these payments on fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals expenditures is estimated 
                                                        
18 Pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing is industry code 3253. 
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using weighted ordinary least squares regression (OLS) while controlling for other farm 
and farmer characteristics.  As previously mentioned, decoupled direct payments are 
given on the farm level, so Phase III data is well suited for this investigation.  However, 
Phase III data does not contain data on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use, only 
total expenditures.  Thus, fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures act as the 
measures of fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use.  These expenditures are 
normalized with respect to total acres operated to control for farm size.   
 Thus, the two dependent variables are adjusted fertilizer expenditures per total 
acres operated (FERT) and adjusted other agricultural chemical expenditures per total 
acres operated (CHEM).  CHEM includes all agricultural chemicals not classified as 
fertilizer.  Both dependent variables are adjusted using the producer price index for 
pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing.  While the analysis 
would be improved by using quantities of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals 
rather than expenditures, this information is not readily available.   
 A list of all variables used in the OLS regressions can be found in Table 5.3.  
WACF and WACAC are included as independent variables and serve as a measure of the 
input price of the dependent variables FERT and CHEM, respectively.  An increase in 
WACF is expected to increase FERT; an increase in WACAC is expected to increase 
CHEM.   
 Several farm and farm characteristics are also included in the analysis.  Harvested 
acres of the seven program crops used to calculate the weighted average cost functions 
are included in the analysis as independent variables (HBARLEY, HCORN, HCOTTON, 
 60 
HOATS, HSORGH, HSOY, and HWHEAT).  These variables are normalized with 
respect to total acres operated.  Expected signs for these variables are unclear.  Since the 
variables are normalized, an increase in harvested acres of any one of the seven crops 
necessarily changes the crop mix.  For example, if harvested acres of oats divided by total 
acres operated per farm (HOATS) decreases but total acres operated remains the same, 
the acres of oats must have been replaced by another crop or idled.  If the replacement 
crop uses more fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals per acre, the decrease in 
HOATS will increase FERT and CHEM.  If HOATS is replaced with crop using less 
fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, the relationship will be negative.  Total acres 
operated per farm (ACRESOP) is included as a size control since economies of size may 
be possible. 
     A measure of wealth is also included (WEALTH) in the regression model, 
calculated as total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts per total acres 
operated, adjusted using CPI.  The expected sign for wealth is unclear.  As wealth 
increases, fertilizer and agricultural chemical expenditures may increase because more 
funds are available; this would be particularly true at low levels of wealth.  Conversely, 
since fertilizers and agricultural chemicals may act as possible insurance against low 
yield (Ramaswami, 1992; Hennessy 1998), there is an incentive for farmers with low 
levels of wealth to apply more fertilizers and pesticides.    
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FERT Fertilizer expenditures divided by total acres operated, 
adjusted using PPI 
 
CHEM Agricultural chemical expenditures divided by total acres 
operated, adjusted using PPI 
 
HBARLEY Harvested acres of barley divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HCORN Harvested acres of corn divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HCOTTON Harvested acres of cotton divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HOATS Harvested acres of oats divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HSORGH Harvested acres of sorghum divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HSOY Harvested acres of soybean divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
HWHEAT Harvested acres of wheat divided by total acres operated (+ or -) 
ACRESOP Total acres operated per farm  (+) 
WEALTH Total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts 
(wealth) per total acres operated, adjusted using CPI 
(+ or -) 
AGE Age of primary farm operator (+ or -) 
TENURE Ratio of owned to operated acres (+) 
DP Total decoupled direct payments per total acres operated, 
adjusted using CPIa 
(+) 
GOV Government payments less decoupled payments per total acres 
operated, adjusted using CPI 
(+) 
WACF Weighted average cost of fertilizer, adjusted using PPIb (+) 
WACAC Weighted average cost of agricultural chemicals, adjusted 
using PPIb 
(+) 
INSURE Ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm, 
adjusted using CPI  
(+) 
SOLVE Ratio of total farm financial debt to total farm financial assets 
(solvency), adjusted using CPI 
(+) 
DP*INSURE Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & insurance 
expenditures 
(-) 
DP*SOLVE Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & solvency (-) 
GOV*INSURE Interaction term: government payments & insurance  
expenditures 
(-) 
GOV*SOLVE Interaction term: government payments & solvency (-) 
TIME Time trend (+ or -) 
TIMESQ Time trend squared  (+ or -) 
COUNTY County dummy variables (+ or -) 
Notes: a- Decoupled payments includes production flexibility contracts, fixed direct payments, and 
counter-cyclical payments.  b- WACF and WACAC include prices for all seven crops in model. 
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 Two additional farmer characteristics that may contribute to changes in FERT and 
CHEM are the age of the primary operator (AGE) and the ratio of owned to operated 
acres (TENURE).  The primary operator’s total years of farm experience (YEARSEXP) 
are not available for all years examined, so age is used as a proxy.19
 Decoupled direct payments and all other government payments are represented by 
GOV and DP, respectively.  DP includes production flexibility contracts, fixed direct 
payments, and countercyclical payments received by farmers.  GOV is calculated as all 
other government payments.  ARMS and FCRS surveys do not always distinguish 
between coupled payments, such as deficiency payments, and lump sum payments, such 
  The age of the 
primary operator may be positively or negatively related to fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemical use.  A young operator may be more inclined to minimize fertilizer 
and chemical use due to concerns about health and/or the environment, while an older 
operator may be more knowledgeable about crop production and be able to reduce 
fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use through learning from past experiences.  
TENURE may affect FERT and CHEM because landowners may have a greater incentive 
to increase yields by increasing their use of production inputs.  The expected sign for 
TENURE is therefore positive.  Furthermore, decoupled direct payments are paid to the 
operator of the farm, not the owner; however an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the 
payment is capitalized into increased rental rates (Kirwan, 2009).  Hence, tenure is an 
important variable.    
                                                        
19 For the years 2002 through 2008, AGE and YEARSEXP have a correlation coefficient of 0.80.   
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as conservation program payments. Therefore, GOV represents coupled and lump sum 
payments.  Both variables are adjusted using CPI.   
 Two measures of risk aversion are included in the model: INSURE and SOLVE.  
Following Goodwin and Mishra’s (2006) estimation of a farmer’s level of risk, INSURE 
is the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm, adjusted using CPI.  The 
more risk averse a farmer is, the more insurance he may purchase relative to other 
expenditures, therefore, the expected sign is positive if fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals are risk reducing inputs.  However, currently there is some debate in the 
literature regarding whether these inputs are risk reducing or risk increasing (Horowitz & 
Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992).   
 SOLVE is the solvency ratio measured as total farm financial debt to total farm 
financial assets, adjusted using CPI.  Solvency acts as a proxy for the farm’s level of 
credit constraint and financial risk.  A farmer that is less solvent may increase the use of 
risk reducing inputs to insure a good yield in order to avoid defaulting on debt 
obligations.  Second, solvency indicates whether a farmer is credit constrained: the more 
debt a farmer has, the less likely he can access more credit.  Goodwin and Mishra (2006) 
use a variable similar to SOLVE as a proxy for a farmer’s degree of credit constraint, 
thus testing the hypothesis that decoupled direct payments affect the degree of credit 
constraint and is a coupling mechanism for decoupled payments.  A positive sign for 
SOLVE can therefore suggest two things: financially risky farmers view fertilizer and 
other agricultural chemicals as risk reducing inputs, and if a farmer is credit constrained 
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and decoupled payments relax the credit constraint conditions, then this provides a 
possible coupling mechanism.  SOLVE is expected to have a positive sign. 
 Four interaction terms (DP*INSURE, DP*GOV, GOV*INSURE, and 
GOV*SOLVE) are also included in the models to allow both government payments and 
decoupled payments to vary with different levels of risk aversion and solvency.  A 
negative sign is expected for all interaction terms.  At low levels of INSURE and 
SOLVE, the marginal effects of both GOV and DP on FERT and CHEM increase with 
increasing levels of INSURE and SOLVE.  However, at higher levels of INSURE, the 
marginal effects of both GOV and DP on FERT and CHEM are expected to decrease due 
to wealth effects (Hennessy, 1998).  At higher levels of SOLVE, the marginal effects of 
both GOV ad DP on both dependent variables are expected to increase due to reduced 
credit constraints (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).   
 Since the data spans 17 years, a time trend is included in the model. A positive 
sign for TIME implies that from 1991 to 2008, fertilizer or agricultural chemical use has 
increased due to technological advances or other changes not captured by other regressors 
in the model.  A positive sign for TIMESQ would imply this is occurring at an increasing 
rate.  The expected signs of these variables are uncertain.  Increased use of plants 
genetically modified to encourage greater yields may reduce the amounts of either 
production input being applied.  On the other hand, increased use of low-tillage crop 
management may increase the use of agricultural chemicals because more weeds grow on 
low- or no-till land.   
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 Lastly, dummy variables for each county (COUNTY) are included in the model to 
account for variability not captured by the other regressors, including: 1) transportation 
costs for volatile fertilizers that may change across counties, 2) soil and land quality that 
may differ across counties, and 3) unobserved growing conditions, such as drought and 
disease, that vary by county.   
Regression Equations 
 The models can be summarized by Equations (5.3) and (5.4).  The only 
differences between the variables used in these equations are the dependent variables and 
the weighted average cost functions.  Note that there is no intercept in the model to allow 
all county dummies to remain in the model for ease of interpretation.  Additionally, 
HCROP is a term used to identify harvested acres divided by total acres operated of the 
seven program crops in the model: barley (HBARLEY), corn (HCORN), cotton 
(HCOTTON), oats (HOATS), sorghum (HSORGH), soybeans (HSOY), and wheat 
(HWHEAT).  By not aggregating harvested crops into one variable, changes in input use 
through changes to the intensive margin can be observed through changes in crop mix 
and farming acreage more intensely.  
(5.3)  
FERT = α i HCROPi
i=1
7
∑ +α8ACRESOP +α9WEALTH +α10DP +α11GOV +
α12AGE +α13TENURE +α14WACF +α15INSURE +α16SOLVE +
α17DP * INSURE +α18DP * SOLVE +α19GOV * INSURE +α20GOV * SOLVE +







CHEM = βi HCROPi
i=1
7
∑ + β8ACRESOP + β9WEALTH + β10DP + β11GOV
+β12AGE + β13TENURE + β14WACAC + β15INSURE + β16SOLVE +
β17DP * INSURE + β18DP * SOLVE + β19GOV * INSURE + β20GOV * SOLVE +












In practical terms, this means that holding all else constant, a one-year increase in the age 
of the primary operator increases fertilizer expenditures by approximately α12.  
Interpretations of non-interaction terms are similar to that of AGE. 

















= β11 + β19INSURE + β20SOLVE . 
Equations (5.6) and (5.7) illustrate that the marginal effect of decoupled direct payments 
(DP) on FERT and CHEM depends upon the direct effect captured in coefficients α10 and 
β10 and the indirect effects from decoupled direct payment’s interaction with INSURE 
and SOLVE.  Similarly, Equations (5.8) and (5.9) illustrate that the marginal effect of 
other government payments (GOV) on FERT and CHEM depends upon the direct effect 
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captured in coefficients α10 and β10 and the indirect effects from other government 
payment’s interaction with INSURE and SOLVE.  As INSURE and SOLVE change, so 
will the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments and government payments on 
fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use.  For completeness, the marginal effects of 
















= β16 + β18DP + β20GOV . 
Testing Structural Breaks 
 Structural breaks in 1996, 2002, and 2008 are expected due to policy changes in 
those years.  Chow tests are conducted to test for structural breaks at the time the policy 
change occurred.  Chow tests are used in time-series data to test if coefficients of one 
segment of the data are statistically significantly different than the coefficients of a 
second time period (Chow, 1960).  If decoupled direct payments increase fertilizer and 
other agricultural chemical use, a structural break may appear in 1996.  If updating 
changes farmer’s decisions about production inputs, specifically fertilize and agricultural 
chemicals, a structural break will be found in 2002.  Because there is no data available 
after 2008, the hypothesis that changes in the 2008 Farm Bill lead to a structural break 
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cannot be tested using this data.  Chow tests are conducted comparing a model using the 
whole data series (data from 1991 to 2008) to the restricted model that allows all 
coefficients to change at three different subsets: 1991-1995 (years without decoupled 
direct payments), 1996-2001 (years following the introduction of decoupled payments), 
and 2002-2008 (years after the policy updating occurred in 2002).    
 An iterative Chow test is also conducted to estimate if the structural breaks due to 
policy implementation occurred slightly before or after the implementation, suggesting 
that farmers may anticipate new policy changes or, alternatively, have a lagged response 
to new policy changes.  Breaks are considered for one and two years before and after 
1996 and 2002.  Since there was an additional policy change in 2008 creating ACRE, an 
additional break in 2006 is also assessed.  This iterative Chow test procedure requires 48 
additional tests to be run for each model, with the highest F-statistic determining the best 




 Implementing the methodology discussed in the previous chapter, the hypothesis 
that there exists a positive and significant relationship between both coupled government 
payments and decoupled direct payments and the use of agricultural chemicals and 
fertilizer is tested.  Although a positive sign is expected for both types of payments, the 
magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments may be greater than or less than the 
magnitude of the effect of coupled government payments, depending on the size of 
coupled price supports (PSit) relative to decoupled farm subsidies (α itSit ), the subjective 
probability of updating (γ ), and the discount rate δ .  Descriptive statistics are presented 
and then the weighted ordinary least squares regression results for each specified model 
are examined.   
Summary Statistics 
 Summary statistics are derived using data collected in the 1991 to 1995 Farm Cost 
and Reports Survey and the 1996 to 2008 Agricultural Resources and Management 
Survey by the National Statistics Service (NASS), United States Department of 
Agriculture.  Any interpretations and conclusions derived from the data represent the 
author’s views and not necessarily those of NASS.   
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Table 6.1.  Summary Statistics, 1991-2008 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
FERT  $16.48  $138.28  $0.00  $358.81 
CHEM  $12.08  $100.05  $0.00  $198.28 
WACF  $25.40  $76.97  $5.08  $53.58 
WACAC  $16.72  $50.70  $0.66  $60.32 
ABARLEY*  1.93  248.64  0   
ACORN*  224.91  3298.34  0   
ACOTTON*  1.08  384.22  0   
AOATS*  2.09  177.66  0   
AOILSEED*  2.18  337.55  0   
APEANUT*  0.00  0.00  0   
APULSE*  1.35  225.94  0   
ARICE*  0.64  256.03  0   
ASORGH*  4.70  347.36  0   
ASOY*  207.44  2926.94  0   
AWHEAT*  41.05  1706.81  0   
HCORN+  0.32  2.24  0  1.00 
HCOTTON+  0.001  0.27  0  1.00 
HSORGH+  0.01  0.46  0  0.91 
HSOY+  0.30  2.09  0  1.00 
HBARLEY+  0.002  0.20  0  0.75 
HOATS+  0.01  0.27  0  0.64 
HWHEAT+  0.04  1.04  0  0.99 
ACRESOP  671.44  8,436.66  1.00   
TENURE  0.56  9.31  0  161.00 
AGE  54  15  17  98 
YEARSEXP*  29.80  14.0  0  75 
WEALTH  $1,198.03  $43,369.70  $(1,240.24)  $315,709.35 
NINCOME*  $52,295.87  $133,540.57  $(158,312.26)  $2,874,809.57 
INSURE  0.06  0.54  0  0.83 
SOLVE  0.10  5.68  0  140.34 
DP  $4.88  $73.59  $0.00  $305.25 
GOV  $9.81  $147.76  $(3.71)  $545.34 
Notes: Number of observations is 25,071 except for WACF and WACAC, which have 24,140 
observations, APULSE and AOILSEED, which have 7,214, SOLVE, which has 25,050 observations, and 
YEARSEXP, which has 13,957 observations.  *Some variables are not in the model: YEARSEXP is 
defined as the primary operator’s years of farm experience and NINCOME is defined as net farm 
income.  Crop variables beginning with A are non-normalized harvested acres of all program crops. 
+Crop variables beginning with H represent average proportions of total harvested acres per farm.  
Maximums cannot be reported due to disclosure restrictions on the data. 
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 Table 6.1 contains summary statistics of all variables within the model as well as 
two variables that are not included due to endogeneity (net farm income, NINCOME) and 
missing observations in some years (primary operator’s years of farm experience, 
YEARSEXP).  Additionally, summary statistics for non-normalized harvested acres of all 
program crops are included (ABARLEY, ACORN, ACOTTON, AOATS, AOILSEED, 
APEANUT, APULSE, ASORGH, ASOY, AWHEAT).  The sample size is 25,571 for all 
but six variables: WACF and WACAC have only 24,140 observations, APULSE and 
AOILSEED have 7,214 observations, SOLVE has 25,050 observations, and YEARSEXP 
has 13,597 observations. 
Farm Characteristics  
 Between 1991 and 2008, average fertilizer expenditures per acres operated 
(FERT) is $16.48, slightly greater than the average other agricultural chemical 
expenditure per acres operated (CHEM) of $12.08.  The weighted average cost of 
fertilizer is slightly higher than the weighted average cost of other agricultural chemicals, 
signifying that fertilizer used on the seven crops present in the model is on average more 
expensive per acre to apply than other agricultural chemicals.  Alternatively, it is possible 
that more fertilizer is used per acre than other agricultural chemicals.  The large standard 
deviation on both expenditures is most likely due to the differences in what each farm 
produces.  Since not all farms produce a homogenous mix of crops, per acre expenditures 
for production inputs can vary dramatically between farms.  An un-pooled t-test shows 
that there is not a significant difference in average fertilizer expenditures per acre after 
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policy changes occurred in 1996 and 2002.20  Additionally, an un-pooled t-test comparing 
average agricultural chemical expenditures per acre in 1991 through 1995 to 1996 
through 2001 found no significant difference in the means.21  However, a significant 
decrease in other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre is found after 2002 relative 
to 1996 to 2001 agricultural chemical expenditures: average CHEM between 1996 and 
2001 is $13.80/acre and $10.60/acre between 2002 and 2008.22
 Total acres operated (ACRESOP) averaged 671 acres over the 17 years.  Of the 
total acres operated, 56 percent is owned by the primary operator and the remaining 44 
percent is rented (TENURE).  Average harvested acres vary widely: average harvested 
acres of corn per farm is the highest at 225, followed by soybeans at 207 harvested acres 
per farm, and wheat at just 4 harvested acres per farm, on average.  Note that peanuts are 
not grown in the extended Heartland region and the average acres harvested rice is less 
than 1 acre per farm.  Neither of these crops is used in the regression analysis because it 
is expected that rice and peanuts contribute little to nothing to fertilizer or agricultural 
chemical expenditures in the region analyzed.   
 
 Corn, wheat, and soybeans are the only crops grown in all nine states sampled, 
however corn and soybeans appear to have the largest allotment of harvested acreage 
relative to total acres operated.  The average farm allocates 32 percent of total acres 
                                                        
20 The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures per acre in 1991-1995 to 1996-2001 is 
-0.153 with a reported p-value of 0.878.  The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures 
per acre in 1996-2001 to 2002-2008 is -0.725 with a reported p-value of 0.234.   
21 The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average agricultural chemical expenditures per acre in 1991-1995 to 
1996-2001 is -0.859 with a reported p-value of 0.969.   
22 The un-pooled t-statistic comparing average fertilizer expenditures per acre in 1996-2001 to 2002-2008 is 
2.162 with a reported p-value of 0.031.   
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operated to corn (HCORN) and 30 percent to soybeans (HSOY).  See Appendix Table 
B.1 for a detailed table of average crop harvest per state.  Furthermore, a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.28 between HCORN and HSOY suggest that farmers 
harvesting corn are likely to harvest soybeans since famers generally produce these two 
crops in a rotation or together.  Moreover, corn and wheat are negatively correlated with 
a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.30, suggesting that wheat is grown when corn is 
not.  Barley and wheat are also significantly correlated with a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of 0.22.   Cotton is only grown in one state, Missouri, with slightly more than 
14 acres harvested per farm, on average.       
 There is a positive and significant 0.52 correlation between harvested corn per 
acres operated (HCORN) and fertilizer expenditures (FERT) as well as a 0.45 Pearson 
correlation coefficient between harvested corn and agricultural chemical expenditures 
(CHEM).  On average corn requires the most fertilizers and agricultural chemicals of any 
program crop.  Soybeans (HSOY) have the next highest correlations between the 
dependent variables FERT and CHEM: 0.23 and 0.39, respectively.   
Farmer Characteristics 
 The average age of the primary farm operator is 54; the youngest farmer in the 
sample is 17, the oldest 98.  On average, the primary operator has almost 30 years of 
experience working on a farm (YEARSEXP). Forty-eight percent of farmers have 
graduated from high school and 16 percent have graduated from college.23
                                                        
23 More detailed information can be found in Appendix Figure B.3. 
  The mean 
wealth, adjusted with respect to acres to account for farm size, is approximately $1,200 
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with a standard deviation of $43,000.  Another measure of farm economic status is net 
farm income (NINCOME), which is $52,295.87 for this sample with a standard deviation 
of $133,540.57.  The large standard deviations indicate an uneven distribution of wealth 
and income across the sampled farms.  In fact, 74 percent of farms have a total value of 
production greater than $100,000 annually.  On average, farms spend 6 percent of all 
expenditures on insurance, including subsidized crop insurance required to participate in 
most government crop programs.  Lastly, the average farm sampled has a solvency ratio 
of 0.10, indicating that the farms in the sample have very little debt on average. 
Government Payments 
 Eighty-eight percent of all sampled farms receive decoupled payments after their 
introduction in 1996.  Farms collect $7.50 on average in decoupled direct payments (DP) 
per operated acre (after 1996) and almost twice that in all other government payments 
(GOV).  Again, there is a wide range of farms represented and large standard deviations 
for both GOV and DP ($147.76 and $73.59, respectively).  Between 1996, when 
decoupled payments were introduced, and 2008, the average payment per acre fluctuated 
(see Appendix Figure B.1).  The first four years saw an almost doubling of DP, followed 
by three years of declining payments and then an increase until 2005, when decoupled 
payments per acre hit their maximum value of $10.93.  Participation in direct decoupled 
payment programs (specifically production flexibility contracts, countercyclical 
payments, and fixed direct payments) does not seem to follow the same trend, suggesting 
that farmers do not enroll in the program in anticipation of higher payments.   
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Regression Analysis Results: 1991-2008 
 To test our hypotheses that both decoupled direct payments and coupled payments 
have a significant and positive effect on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical use, 
weighted ordinary least squares regression procedures are used to estimate Equations 
(6.1) and (6.2) below using the appropriate sample weights.24
(6.1)  
  The resulting coefficients 
and standard errors are reported in Table 6.2.      
FERT = α i HCROPi
i=1
7
∑ +α8ACRESOP +α9WEALTH +α10DP +α11GOV +
α12AGE +α13TENURE +α14WACF +α15INSURE +α16SOLVE +
α17DP * INSURE +α18DP * SOLVE +α19GOV * INSURE +α20GOV * SOLVE +






CHEM = βi HCROPi
i=1
7
∑ + β8ACRESOP + β9WEALTH + β10DP + β11GOV
+β12AGE + β13TENURE + β14WACAC + β15INSURE + β16SOLVE +
β17DP * INSURE + β18DP * SOLVE + β19GOV * INSURE + β20GOV * SOLVE +





Model 1: Fertilizers (1991 – 2008) 
 The model with fertilizer expenditures per acre as a dependent variable (Model 1) 
has 24,118 observations over the 17-year time period of 1991 to 2008.  The effects of the 
county dummy variables (COUNTY) are not reported due to the large number of counties 
in the sample (764 counties are represented).  All but two variables (WEALTH and 
                                                        
24 Appropriate weights were assigned using professional expertise from the U.S. Economic Research 
Service. 
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GOV*SOLVE) have coefficients that are statistically different than zero at a 5 percent 
level of significance (Table 6.2).   
 All harvested acres of program crops per total operated acres have a positive and 
significant relationship with fertilizer expenditures, with harvested corn acreage having 
the largest coefficient and oats having the smallest.  Although precise relationships 
should not be implied by the coefficients, the magnitudes suggest that an increase in 
acreage allotted to corn will increase fertilizer expenditures more than a similar increase 
in acreage allotted to oats.  These results reflect the important role of crop mix in the 
consumption of fertilizer.  Total acres operated had a small statistically significant 
positive relationship with fertilizer expenditures per acre.  This implies the effect of 
economies of size is small and a farmer’s crop mix is more important than total acreage 
when determining fertilizer expenditures per acre.  A positive relationship is also found 
between TENURE and FERT: the more land the primary operator owns relative to 
renting, the greater fertilizer expenditures per acre are, suggesting that capitalization may 
play an important role in input decisions on the farm. 
 Because of the presence of the four interaction terms (DP*INSURE, DP*SOLVE, 
GOV*INSURE, and GOV*SOLVE), Equations (5.6), (5.8), (5.10), and (5.12) presented 
in the methodology chapter are used to calculate the marginal effect at the mean of 
decoupled direct payments per acre (DP), other government payments per acre (GOV), 
the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm (INSURE), and solvency 
(SOLVE) on fertilizer expenditures per acre, respectively.25
                                                        
25 Marginal effects and the means at which they were calculated are found in Appendix C. 
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 The marginal effect of INSURE on fertilizer expenditures per acre evaluated at 
the mean is -32.25, which is unexpectedly negative.  A positive sign is expected for the 
effect of insurance expenditures because the more risk-averse a farmer is the more he 
should increase his use of risk-reducing inputs such as fertilizer.  However, the measure 
for risk-aversion (INSURE) is significantly negative indicating an increase in the 
insurance ratio leads to decreased fertilizer expenditures per acre.   
 There are a few possible justifications for this unexpected result.  First, some 
farmers may view fertilizer as a risk-increasing input, meaning that risk averse farmers 
would decrease their use of fertilizer.  Whether fertilizer is risk-increasing or decreasing 
is debated in the literature (Horowitz & Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, Weersink, & 
Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992).  Second, insurance expenditures as a proportion of 
total farm expenditures may be too simplistic a measure of farmer’s risk aversion, 
particularly within this model, where there may be some endogeneity issues due to the 
dependent variable FERT being a portion of total expenditures.  Furthermore, an increase 
in the effect of INSURE may be caused by a decrease in total expenditures (the 
denominator of the ratio).   
 Contrarily, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of SOLVE, an estimation of 
the level of a farmer’s credit constraint, is 0.86.  If a farmer is less solvent (and therefore 
has a greater solvency ratio), he will increase risk-reducing inputs like fertilizer because 
the farmer wants to insure a good yield and ensure he will not default on his debt 
obligations. 
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Table 6.2.  Fertilizer and Other Agricultural Chemical Weighted OLS 
Regression Results, 1991-2008 
  Models 
 
 Fertilizer (1) 
 Other Agricultural 
Chemicals (2) 
  Coeff.  Std. Error  Coeff.  Std. Error 
HBARLEY  13.43***  3.84  1.59  2.91 
HCORN  28.70***  0.67  15.77***  0.39 
HCOTTON  16.41***  3.66  35.84***  2.97 
HOATS  6.97**  2.83  -13.72***  2.20 
HSORGH  16.40***  1.76  11.79***  1.31 
HSOY  8.36***  0.72  11.86***  0.37 
HWHEAT  15.24***  1.01  7.94***  0.88 
ACRESOP  0.0005***  0.00009  0.0004***  0.00007 
WEALTH  0.000009  0.00007  0.0003***  0.00006 
DP  0.19***  0.02  0.17***  0.01 
GOV  0.11***  0.01  0.04***  0.01 
AGE  -0.03***  0.01  -0.003  0.004 
TENURE  2.53***  0.21  1.35***  0.15 
WACF/WACACa  0.17***  0.02  0.12***  0.03 
INSURE  -23.78***  2.50  -17.98***  1.85 
SOLVE  1.58***  0.55  2.34***  0.41 
DP*INSURE  -0.74***  0.27  -0.57***  0.20 
DP*SOLVE  -0.09**  0.04  -0.20***  0.03 
GOV*INSURE  -0.49***  0.14  0.18*  0.10 
GOV*SOLVE  -0.03  0.04  0.12***  0.03 
TIME  -0.23***  0.06  0.68***  0.04 
TIMESQ  0.02***  0.003  -0.04***  0.003 
Observations  24,118  24,118 
Adjusted R Squared  0.399  0.342 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate parameter significance at  α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.               
a- WACF used for Fertilizer model, WACAC used for Agricultural Chemical model.  County 
dummy variables are not reported due to the large number of counties (764) in the sample.  
Additionally, the intercept is dropped to allow all counties to remain in model.     
 As hypothesized, an increase in decoupled direct payments and government 
payments both increase fertilizer expenditures per acre by a small but statistically 
significant amount.  Coupled government payments based on production, inputs, or prices 
are known to increase input use.  However, decoupled direct payments are, in theory, not 
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based on production, inputs, or prices unless they are linked by any of the coupling 
mechanisms previously discussed.  The results for modeling fertilizer as the dependent 
variable suggest that decoupled direct payments may affect a farmer’s decision to use 
fertilizers, although without panel data causality cannot be tested.  The marginal effect of 
government payments on fertilizer use per acre operated calculated at the mean is 0.08.  
The marginal effect of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use per acre operated 
evaluated at the mean is 0.138, suggesting that the effect of DP on FERT is greater than 
the effect of GOV on FERT.   
 Furthermore, the results for DP*INSURE and DP*SOLVE suggest that there are 
three avenues by which decoupled direct payments may affect fertilizer expenditures per 
acre: first, directly as seen through DP, second, indirectly through changes in risk 
preferences (DP*INSURE), and third, indirectly through changes in financial risk 
preferences (DP*SOLVE).     
 These results confirm the hypothesis: the effects of government payments and 
decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use are both positive.  Also, there is a greater 
marginal effect of decoupled direct payments than other government payments.   This 
indicates that decoupled payments might affect the intensive margin more than other 
government programs and hence decoupled payments could ultimately lead to larger 
production distortions or greater negative environmental impacts.  GOV includes lump 
sum payments that have no effect on production and production distorting price supports, 
thus the effect of GOV serves as a lower bound on the effect of coupled payments on 
fertilizer expenditures per acre.      
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 The effect of age on fertilizer expenditures per acre is negatively significant 
(AGE): as a farmer’s age increases, fertilizer expenditures per acre decrease, although not 
by a large magnitude.  This supports the proposition that farmers with more experience26
Model 2: Other Agricultural Chemicals (1991 – 2008) 
 
use less fertilizer, perhaps because they are familiar with other methods, or are reluctant 
to apply more fertilizer.  The two time trend variables (TIME and TIMESQ) together 
suggest that over time, fertilizer expenditures have decreased at an increasing rate.  This 
may be due to technological advances in production practices such as genetically 
modified crops that may require less fertilizer.   
 A weighted ordinary least squares regression is also estimated for other 
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre with similar results.  The analysis uses 24,118 
observations.  Only two variables were insignificant at the 5 percent significance level: 
harvested acres of barley per operated acres (HBARLEY) and age.  The time trends 
(TIME and TIMESQ) suggest that holding all else constant, as time progresses, 
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre operated increase at a decreasing rate.     
 Contrary to Model 1, the agricultural chemical model does not have positive 
coefficients associated with the ratio of program crops to total operated acres for all 
crops.  The effect of HOATS is negative and significantly related to agricultural chemical 
expenditure per acre operated, suggesting that oats require fewer agricultural chemicals to 
produce than the other program crops in the model.  Like in the fertilizer model, the 
                                                        
26 Recall that AGE was used as a proxy for farm experience because of the high correlation (0.80) between 
AGE and YEARSEXP. 
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coefficients associated with the seven program crops in the agricultural chemical model 
are not the same for all crops.  For example, the coefficient for HCOTTON implies that a 
1 percent increase of total acres operated used for harvesting cotton increases agricultural 
chemical expenditures per acre by approximately $36.00, while a 1 percent increase of 
total acres operated used for harvesting corn increases CHEM less than half that amount.  
The coefficient for HBARLEY is not significant perhaps because of the low average 
barley acres harvested.  Similar to Model 1, total acres operated is statistically significant 
but small.   
 The marginal effect of INSURE evaluated at the mean is -17.98, which may 
imply that other agricultural chemicals may also be a risk-increasing input.  The marginal 
effect of SOLVE evaluated at the mean is 2.34, suggesting that as a farm become more 
credit constrained, it increases expenditures of other agricultural chemicals per acre.  
 Coefficients for government payments per acres operated (GOV) and decoupled 
direct payments per acres operated (DP) are both positive and small, but statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction terms with DP are 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that decoupled direct payments affect 
agricultural chemical expenditures through changes in risk preference (DP*INSURE) 
and/or credit constraints (DP*SOLVE) (Goodwin & Mishra 2006).  Coefficients on the 
interaction terms for government payments are negative, indicating that the marginal 
effect of government payments on agricultural chemicals decreases with an increase in 
solvency and/or insurance expenditures.  The marginal effects of GOV and DP calculated 
at the mean are 0.06 and 0.11, respectively, giving similar results to those found in the 
 82 
fertilizer model: the effects of government payments and decoupled direct payments on 
agricultural chemical use are both positive.  Also, the marginal effect of decoupled direct 
payments is greater than the marginal effects of other government payments evaluated at 
the means, indicating that decoupled payments may have greater effects on the intensive 
margin than other government payments. 
Regression Analysis Results: Structural Breaks 
 Structural breaks in 1996, 2002, and 2008 are expected due to policy changes in 
those years.  Chow tests are conducted to test structural breaks at the time the policy 
changes occurred.  Because no data is available after 2008, the hypothesis that a structural 
break occurs in 2008 is not possible to test.  A Chow test is used to find the hypothesized 
structural breaks when the data is split into three subsets: 1991-1995, 1996-2001, and 
2002-2008.  The F-statistic for the fertilizer model with structural breaks in 1996 and 
2002 is 18.05 (p=0).  For the other agricultural chemicals model with structural breaks in 
1996 and 2002, the F-test is 13.46 (p=0).    
 In order to test if there was any anticipation of policy changes or lags in farmer’s 
decision to update due to policy changes, additional Chow tests are conducted for one 
and two years before and after each policy change.  Since there was an additional policy 
change in 2008 creating ACRE, Chow tests are also conducted adding an additional break 
in 2006.  This iterative Chow test procedure requires 48 additional tests to be run for each 
model, with the highest F-statistic determining the best fit structural breaks.27
                                                        
27 Iterative Chow tests are found in Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2.    
  This 
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process finds that for fertilizer, structural breaks in 1996 and 2004 are a better fit than the 
hypothesized breaks in 1996 and 2002.  For other agricultural chemicals, the best fit 
structural breaks occur in 1996 and 2000.  This section begins with an explanation of the 
hypothesized fertilizer and other agricultural chemical models and then compares the 
results to the respective models with structural breaks determined by the iterative Chow 
tests.     
Fertilizers (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2002)  
 Table 6.3 reports the weighted OLS regression results for the model with fertilizer 
expenditures per acre as the dependent variable with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002.  
There are 4,755 observations in the first subset (1991-1995), 6,788 observations in the 
second subset (1996-2001), and 12,575 observations in the third subset (2002-2008).  The 
adjusted R2 values are 0.50, 0.50, and 0.42, respectively, all of which are higher than the 
adjusted R2 value of 0.40 for fertilizer Model 1 using all years.  The first subset (1991-
1995) does not have coefficients or standard errors for decoupled payments or the 
interaction terms including that variable because before 1996, there were no decoupled 
direct payments.  Thus, all government payments are captured in the GOV variable.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient corresponding to government payments per acres operated in 
this time period is almost triple the magnitude of the same variable in Model 1 using all 
the sampled years.   
 Very few of the coefficients have changed sign or magnitude compared to Table 
6.2, however the coefficient for HOATS is five times larger than in Model 1.  Another 
change from the first model is that the interaction term between government payments 
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and solvency is statistically significant in the 1991 to 1995 subset.  Whether these 
coefficients are statistically different from their corresponding coefficients in the whole 
model using all sample years has not been tested, but it is important nonetheless to note 
of these slight changes in the coefficients. 
Table 6.3.  Fertilizer Weighted OLS Regression Results with Structural Breaks in 
1996 and 2002 
 Subsets 













HBARLEY 17.52** 6.34  3.30 8.76  15.92 10.57 
HCORN 27.69** 1.76  26.59*** 1.35  34.38*** 1.07 
HCOTTON 19.25* 8.56  15.99** 6.81  10.92** 5.33 
HOATS 25.86** 6.13  -14.62*** 5.12  -8.93* 5.15 
HSORGH 19.59** 3.60  14.56*** 2.99  18.26*** 4.06 
HSOY 11.33** 1.95  7.37*** 1.52  3.23*** 1.16 
HWHEAT 13.17** 2.28  16.68*** 1.93  13.34*** 1.71 
ACRESOP 0.001** 0.0003  0.0005*** 0.0002  0.0004*** 0.0001 
WEALTH -0.001** 0.0002  0.002*** 0.0002  0.0004*** 0.0001 
DP - -  0.13*** 0.03  0.34*** 0.03 
GOV 0.29** 0.03  0.10*** 0.02  0.11*** 0.02 
AGE -0.05** 0.01  -0.03*** 0.01  -0.03*** 0.01 
TENURE 6.50** 0.52  2.03*** 0.48  0.42 0.27 
WACF 0.18** 0.07  0.11** 0.05  0.03 0.03 
INSURE -20.96** 5.44  -25.69*** 4.78  -13.42*** 4.42 
SOLVE 4.31** 1.48  2.50* 1.45  0.61 0.71 
DP*INSURE - -  0.14 0.46  -2.41*** 0.43 
DP*SOLVE - -  -0.23** 0.11  -0.03 0.06 
GOV*INSURE -0.87** 0.34  -0.66*** 0.22  -0.59** 0.28 
GOV*SOLVE -0.33** 0.09  0.19*** 0.07  -0.03 0.09 
TIME 0.11 0.54  -3.13*** 0.94  1.14 1.01 






0.420 Adjusted R2 
Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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 The Chow tests suggest that there are significant differences within these three 
subsets of the data (years 1991 through 2008) so comparing coefficients across these 
three subsets indicates which characteristics are unique to each subset.  For example, the 
coefficient for HSOY decreases with each subset, going from about 11 in the first subset, 
then 7 in the second subset, and finally 3 in the third subset.  This implies that within 
each subset, an increase in the amount of harvested acres of soybeans increases fertilizer 
expenditures per acre by less and less.  Possible causes of this decrease may be changes 
in soybean production practices or the type of soybeans used due to biotechnology.  The 
effect of HBARLEY is only significant in the first subset.  Also, the effect of HOATS is 
positive and significant (as expected) in the first subset.  In the other subsets the 
coefficient on HOATS are negative and significant, perhaps explaining the much smaller 
HOATS coefficient of 6.97 seen in Table 6.2: for five years, an increase in harvested 
acres of oats increased fertilizer expenditures; for the remaining twelve years, the 
relationship was negative, therefore pulling the coefficient towards zero. 
 Another interesting relationship emerges when comparing the first subset with the 
second: with the introduction of decoupled direct payments in 1996, the marginal effect 
of government payments on fertilizer expenditures per acre evaluated at the mean 
decreases from 0.20 to 0.08.  Between 2002 and 2008, the marginal effect of GOV 
evaluated at the mean remains almost the same (0.07), but the marginal effect of DP 
evaluated at the mean increases from 0.12 between 1996 and 2001 to 0.21 from 2002 to 
2008.  This may imply that after 2002, an increase in decoupled direct payments has a 
larger impact on fertilizer expenditure per acre operated than prior to the enactment of the 
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FSRI Act, possibly because of the introduction of updating.  When the model is broken 
into three subsets, the results support the hypotheses: other government payments and 
decoupled direct payments are significant and positively related to fertilizer expenditures 
per acre.  Future expectations of updating may be an underlying reason that the 
magnitude of the effects of decoupled direct payments increased after 2002.  It is also 
interesting to note that the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use 
is two to three times greater than the marginal effect of other government payments.  
 Lastly, the effects of the time trend variables TIME and TIMESQ are only 
significant in the second subset, where the signs imply that between 1996 and 2001, 
technology and other longitudinal factors decrease fertilizer expenditures at a decreasing 
rate. 
Fertilizers (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2004) 
 Table 6.4 looks very similar to Table 6.3.  In fact, because the hypothesized break 
in 1996 holds, the first subset is identical to the first subset in Table 6.3.  The first subset 
has 4,755 observations, the second subset (1996-2003) has 9,747 observations, and the 
third subset has 9,616 observations.  The adjusted R2 value for each subset is 0.50, 0.41, 
and 0.45, respectively.   
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Table 6.4.  Fertilizer OLS Regression Results with Structural Breaks in 1996 and 
2004 
 Subsets 












HCORN 27.69*** 1.76  26.69*** 1.05  39.49*** 1.33 
HCOTTON 19.25** 8.56  11.78** 5.10  26.13*** 8.74 
HSORGH 19.59*** 3.60  13.73*** 2.50  24.00*** 6.57 
HSOY 11.33*** 1.95  6.36*** 1.16  1.06 1.50 
HBARLEY 17.52*** 6.34  11.52* 7.16  -11.42 17.06 
HOATS 25.86*** 6.13  -12.55*** 4.31  -9.75 6.20 
HWHEAT 13.17*** 2.28  16.12*** 1.62  15.82*** 2.02 
ACRESOP 0.001*** 0.0003  0.0005*** 0.001  0.0003** 0.0001 
WEALTH -0.001*** 0.0002  0.001*** 0.002  0.0005*** 0.0001 
DP - -  0.12*** 0.03  0.39*** 0.04 
GOV 0.29*** 0.03  0.09*** 0.02  0.09*** 0.03 
AGE -0.05*** 0.01  -0.03*** 0.01  -0.01 0.01 
TENURE 6.50*** 0.52  2.53*** 0.39  0.12 0.30 
WACF 0.18*** 0.07  0.05 0.04  -0.05 0.04 
INSURE -20.96*** 5.44  -26.60*** 3.87  -11.96** 5.53 
SOLVE 4.31*** 1.48  0.97 0.70  9.63*** 2.50 
DP*INSURE - -  0.45 0.40  -2.68*** 0.50 
DP*SOLVE - -  -0.11** 0.05  -0.45** 0.18 
GOV*INSURE -0.87*** 0.34  -0.62*** 0.18  -0.60 0.46 
GOV*SOLVE -0.33*** 0.09  0.12** 0.05  0.01 0.15 
TIME 0.11 0.54  -4.00*** 0.50  3.33 2.87 
TIMESQ 0.04 0.09  0.20*** 0.03  -0.07 0.09 
Observations 4,755  9,747  9,616 
Adjusted R2 0.501  0.408  0.450 
Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Finding a structural break in 2004 rather than in 2002 when a new policy was 
enacted indicates that farmers are hesitant to adjust their on-farm production decisions 
until after they see how the policy will affect their own expected utility function.  If a 
farmer expects government policies to change regularly, it may be optimal to wait and 
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see how the new policy may negatively or positively impact him or her.  Because 
fertilizer is such an integral part of the production of program crops, farmers might be 
more likely to hold off on changing input decisions regarding fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemicals.  However, these conjectures are unnecessary: an additional Chow 
test was performed to see if this restricted model with breaks in 1996 and 2004 is 
significantly different than the expected model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002.  
The results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between this model 
and the model described in Table 6.3 (F-test=0.858, p=1).  Therefore, the hypothesized 
breaks for fertilizer hold. 
 The marginal effects of government payments and decoupled direct payments 
evaluated at the means in each of the subsets are also similar to the model with expected 
breaks in 1996 and 2002 (results in Table 6.3).  Between 1991 and 1995, the marginal 
effect of government payments on fertilizer expenditures is 0.20, between 1996 and 2003 
the marginal effect is 0.07, and between 2004 and 2008 the marginal effect is 0.06.  The 
marginal effect of decoupled direct payments evaluated at the mean on fertilizer 
expenditures between 1996 and 2003 is 0.14 and increases to 0.21 between 2004 and 
2008. 
Other Agricultural Chemicals (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2002) 
 Table 6.5 shows the results for the model with other agricultural chemical 
expenditures per acre operated as the dependent variable with structural breaks in 1996 
and 2002.  The first subset includes years 1991 through 1995, the second subset 1996 
through 2001, and the third subset 2002 through 2008.       
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Table 6.5.  Other Agricultural Chemicals Weighted OLS Regression Results with 
Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2002 
 Subsets 












HBARLEY 0.49 5.18  3.10 7.04  5.75 7.08 
HCORN 15.89*** 0.98  16.77*** 0.82  13.55*** 0.61 
HCOTTON 35.94*** 8.00  21.00*** 6.13  22.92*** 4.42 
HOATS -11.59** 5.41  -13.72*** 4.43  -0.42 3.58 
HSORGH 3.31 2.88  18.24*** 2.39  12.73*** 2.70 
HSOY 11.01*** 1.00  14.77*** 0.75  9.24*** 0.55 
HWHEAT 8.01*** 2.44  10.80*** 1.97  7.66*** 1.31 
ACRESOP 0.0006*** 0.0002  0.0004*** 0.0001  0.0002*** 0.00008 
WEALTH 0.0004*** 0.0001  0.0005*** 0.0001  0.0002*** 0.00007 
DP - -  0.26*** 0.03  0.18*** 0.02 
GOV 0.15*** 0.02  -0.02 0.02  0.03** 0.02 
AGE -0.03*** 0.01  -0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
TENURE 2.53*** 0.41  2.13*** 0.38  0.22 0.18 
WACAC 0.12 0.09  0.08 0.07  0.25*** 0.06 
INSURE -23.17*** 4.37  -15.53*** 3.81  -7.57*** 2.95 
SOLVE 3.75*** 1.19  4.14*** 1.16  0.23 0.47 
DP*INSURE - -  -1.65*** 0.37  -0.91*** 0.28 
DP*SOLVE - -  -0.26*** 0.09  -0.001 0.04 
GOV*INSURE -0.41 0.27  0.86*** 0.18  0.16 0.19 
GOV*SOLVE -0.0005 0.07  0.06 0.05  -0.02 0.06 
TIME 2.56*** 0.48  2.35*** 0.69  -0.94 0.68 
TIMESQ -0.32*** 0.08  -0.16*** 0.04  0.01 0.02 
Observations 4,755 6,788 
0.426 
12,575 
0.322 Adjusted R2 0.430 
Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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There are 4,755 observations in the first subset (1991-1995), 6,788 observations in the 
second subset (1996-2001), and 12,575 observations in the third subset (2002-2008).  The 
adjusted R2 values are 0.43, 0.43, and 0.32, respectively. 
 Each of the seven program crops in the model have similar coefficients to the 
agricultural chemical model presented in Table 6.2, with the exception of HSORGH, 
which is smaller in magnitude in the first subset, but not statistically significant.  Also, 
the WACAC coefficient is only statistically different from zero in the third subset.  This 
is somewhat surprising as it may suggest that the price of other agricultural chemicals 
does not affect the other agricultural chemical expenditures per operated acres.  Contrary 
to the fertilizer model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002, the effects of the time 
trend variables are both significant in the first two subsets, suggesting that between 1991 
and 2001, agricultural chemical expenditures have increased at a decreasing rate.    
 Comparing the three subsets of the agricultural chemical model, the absence of 
decoupled direct payments is evident before 1996.  After their introduction at that time, 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between DP and agricultural 
chemical expenditures per acre.  In the second subset, both interaction terms with DP are 
negative.  The marginal effect of decoupled payments per acre operated on other 
agricultural chemical expenditures between 1996 and 2001 is 0.14 evaluated at the mean; 
between 2002 and 2008, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean is 0.13.   
 The effect of other government payments is negative in the second subset (1996-
2001) but not significant.  Otherwise, the effects of government payments per operated 
acre are similar to the results for the whole time period (Model 2).  However, the 
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interaction terms show a weaker relationship in all three subset models relative to the 
results using all the data.  GOV*INSURE is only significant between 1996 and 2001 and 
GOV*SOLVE is not significant in any of the three subsets.  The marginal effect of 
government payments per acre operated on other agricultural chemical expenditures per 
acre evaluated at the mean is 0.13 between 1991 and 1995, 0.04 between 1996 and 2001, 
and 0.04 between 2002 and 2008.        
Agricultural Chemicals: Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2000 
 A Chow test conducted to determine if the model with breaks in 1996 and 2000 is 
significantly different than the hypothesized model with structural breaks in 1996 and 
2002 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the hypothesized 
model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2002 and a model with structural breaks in 1996 
and 2000 (F-statistics=1.983, p=0), shown in Table 6.6.  The break occurring in 2000 
instead of 2002 could be due to farmers’ anticipation of new policies.  This would be the 
opposite of what was explained in the previous fertilizer model.  However, the most 
likely cause of this structural break is not policy related.  In 2000, the patent for 
Monsanto’s chemical herbicide Roundup expired, reducing the price of glyphosphate 
(generic Roundup) dramatically and increasing the volume used in the United States 
(Baccara et al., 2003).  Farmers use this herbicide due to the “broad-spectrum weed 
control, low cost and simplicity” (Shaner, 2000) and have decreased the use of other 
herbicides in place of using glyphosphate.  Additionally, round-up ready crops, which are 
resistant to this herbicide, have also led to increased use of glyphosphate.  It is possible 
 92 
that the effect of increasing use of this chemical after 2000 on other agricultural chemical 
expenditures dominated any structural break due to policy changes in 2002.   
 The number of observations in the first subset (1991-1995) is 4,755, the number 
of observations in the second subset (1996-1999) is 5,060, and the number of 
observations in the third subset (2000-2008) is 14,303.  Respective adjusted R2 values are 
0.430, 0.46, and 0.34.  The first subset (1991-1995) is identical to the first subset 
presented in Table 6.5.  The second and third subsets have minimal changes from the 
previous model with structural breaks at 1996 and 2002, however a few key variables 
have coefficients that are now statistically significant.   
 The effect of the ratio of owned-to-operated acres is positive and significant in 
every subset, indicating that, as a farmer owns more of the total land operated, he or she 
increases expenditures on agricultural chemicals.  Also, the coefficients of the time trend 
variables are significant in all three subsets; thus between 1991 and 2008, agricultural 
chemical expenditures have increased at a decreasing rate.   
 The coefficients on decoupled direct payments and other government payments 
are both positive in all three subsets, but the coefficient on government payments is only 
significant in the first subset (1991-1995).  The effect of the interaction term between DP 
and insurance expenditures is negative and significant from 1996 through 2008, implying 
that the marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on agricultural chemical 
expenditures decreases as insurance expenditures increase.  The coefficient on 
DP*SOLVE is negative but smaller; however, for the third subset (2000-2008), the effect 
is not statistically different than zero.  The marginal effect of decoupled direct payments 
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on agricultural chemical expenditures evaluated at the mean between 1996 and 1999 is 
0.22 and 0.09 after 2000.  The marginal effect of other government payments on 
agricultural chemical expenditures evaluated at the mean is 0.13 before decoupled direct 
payments are introduced, 0.07 between 1996 and 1999, and 0.03 after 2000.   
Table 6.6.  Other Agricultural Chemicals OLS Regression Results with Structural 
Breaks in 1996 and 2000    
 Subsets 












HCORN 15.89*** 0.98  12.83*** 1.03  14.95*** 0.54 
HCOTTON 35.94*** 8.00  17.17** 7.90  26.35*** 3.97 
HSORGH 3.31 2.88  11.44*** 2.87  15.04*** 2.66 
HSOY 11.01*** 1.00  14.55*** 0.94  10.45*** 0.49 
HBARLEY 0.49 5.18  -0.45 8.23  1.23 6.34 
HOATS -11.59** 5.41  0.42 5.27  -9.79*** 3.29 
HWHEAT 8.01*** 2.44  8.68*** 2.45  10.00*** 1.21 
ACRESOP 0.0006*** 0.0002  0.0002 0.0002  0.0003*** 0.00008 
WEALTH 0.0004*** 0.0001  0.0001*** 0.0002  0.0003*** 0.00007 
DP - -  0.37*** 0.03  0.14*** 0.02 
GOV 0.15*** 0.02  0.03 0.03  0.01 0.01 
AGE -0.03*** 0.01  -0.02** 0.01  0.01 0.01 
TENURE 2.53*** 0.41  1.13** 0.47  0.54*** 0.18 
WACAC 0.12 0.09  0.23*** 0.09  0.20*** 0.05 
INSURE -23.17*** 4.37  -14.95*** 4.40  -11.70*** 2.75 
SOLVE 3.75*** 1.19  7.19*** 1.56  0.39 0.46 
DP*INSURE - -  -1.67*** 0.45  -0.80*** 0.25 
DP*SOLVE - -  -0.57*** 0.12  -0.04 0.03 
GOV*INSURE -0.41 0.27  0.41 0.31  0.29** 0.12 
GOV*SOLVE 0.00 0.07  0.12 0.10  0.05 0.03 
TIME 2.56*** 0.48  11.81*** 2.04  2.13*** 0.33 






0.339 Adjusted R2 
Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter significance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter, descriptive statistics are presented to illustrate farm and farmer 
characteristics that might impact the farmer’s decision-making process.  Regression 
results for both fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre operated 
(FERT and CHEM) are analyzed 1) for the whole sample period (1991-2008), 2) with 
structural breaks in 1996 and 2002, and 3) with structural breaks in years found through 
an iterative Chow test.   
 All model results indicate that increases in decoupled direct payments have 
positive affects on fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre with 
the direct effect captured by the coefficient on DP.  This may be due to insurance or 
wealth effects created by an additional income stream (Hennessy, 1998), or possibly 
through farmer’s expectations of updating (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010), or a reduction in 
credit constraints (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).  The marginal effects of government 
payments and decoupled direct payments on both dependent variables (FERT and 
CHEM) are positive, as seen in Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2.   
 The marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemicals evaluated at the mean are two to three times greater than the 
marginal effects of government payments evaluated at the mean.  As noted in the 
discussion for Model 1, since lump sum payments could not be separated from coupled 
payments, the marginal effects of other government payments on fertilizer and other 
agricultural chemical expenditures serves as a lower bound on the effects of fully coupled 
payments (in the form of price floors or per unit subsidies). 
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 These results are in line with the tested hypothesis: There is a positive and 
significant effect of decoupled direct payments (DP) and all other forms of government 
payments (GOV) on both fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per acre.  
Since both dependent variables (FERT and CHEM) and the independent variables (GOV 
and DP) are normalized with respect to total acres operated, these effects are not due to 
farm size.  Furthermore, because FERT and CHEM are adjusted using a sector specific 
PPI and DP and GOV are adjusted using CPI, these effects are not caused by inflation.   
 Between 1991 and 2008, the average government payment per acre operated 
(GOV) is almost twice the average decoupled direct payment per acre operated (DP).  
However, the average DP estimate within that period is low because it includes 5 years of 
zero decoupled payments (1991-1995).  Between 1991 and 1995, the average government 
payment per acre was $11.87.  Between 1996 and 2001, average GOV fell slightly to 
$10.90 and average DP was $7.49.  Interestingly, after updating was allowed in the 2002 
Farm Bill, average decoupled direct payments stayed almost the same ($7.40) while other 
government payments (lump sum and coupled payments) declined to $6.61.  Because DP 
have a greater marginal effect on agricultural chemicals than GOV, this movement 
towards decoupled payments may result in a greater distortion in production through 
changes to the intensive margin.   
 As stated in the hypothesis, the magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct 
payments depends on the payout rates for decoupled direct payments and coupled 
payments, the discount rate δ , and the subjective probability of updating γ .  The results 
indicate that the payout rate for decoupled payments is greater than the payout rate for 
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other government payments after 2002 and the marginal effect of DP on agricultural 
expenditures does increase after 2002.  The regression analysis does not provide a 
measure of the discount rate or the subjective probability of updating.  However, these 
are factors of the magnitude of the effect of decoupled payments on agricultural 
chemicals.  If the discount rate δ is low, farmers will allocate more resources to realizing 
future benefits associated with updating.  In other words, a patient farmer will forego 
benefits today to gain future benefits.  If the subjective probability of updating is 
collectively large (close to 1) for all farms, the impact of policy updates will play an 
important role in the magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments.  The final 
chapter describes the policy implications of these results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Decoupled direct payments were introduced to U.S. agricultural policy in 1996 
with production flexibility contract payments paid to farm operators based on historic 
acreage and yields, not production, prices, or inputs.  This change was motivated by the 
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requiring World Trade Organization 
member countries to reduce trade distorting agricultural policies.  Decoupled payments 
were continued in the two subsequent farm bills.  The Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 gave farmers the option of updating base acreage and yields, 
essentially changes the calculations upon which decoupled payments are based. The 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 gave farmers the option of foregoing a 
portion of their decoupled direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE) program payments based on national market price and state Olympic moving 
average yields. 
  The literature reviewed has identified several mechanisms by which decoupled 
payments have the potential to distort production in the current period.  First, risk averse 
producers may increase production due to insurance and wealth effects associated with 
the decoupled payments.  Second, in imperfect credit markets decoupled payments may 
ease constraints by increasing total wealth.   Third, current production decisions may be 
influenced by expectations of future decoupled payments, especially if updating is 
anticipated.  Fourth, input markets are affected through possible changes in the allocation 
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of labor and land, due to the capitalization of decoupled payments in land values.  Lastly, 
exit deterrence may result in fewer farms leaving the market due to subsidizing fixed 
costs, declining average costs, or cross-subsidization.  If decoupled direct payments are 
coupled to production decisions, farmers may increase their use of production inputs 
including environmentally harmful agricultural chemicals.   
 This thesis tested the hypothesis that there exists a positive and significant 
relationship between both decoupled direct payments and coupled government payments 
and the use of fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals per acre.  Since quantity data 
was not available and prices are controlled for, expenditures per acre serve as a proxy for 
the quantity of agricultural chemicals used.  The relationship between both coupled 
government payments and decoupled direct payments and agricultural chemical use was 
expected to be positive and the theoretical model illustrated that the magnitude of the 
effect of decoupled direct payments relative to the effect of coupled government 
payments depended on the sizes of coupled price supports and decoupled farm subsidies, 
the subjective probability of updating, and the discount rate.  Additionally, structural 
breaks were expected around the time of policy changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008 due to 
expectations of updating.   
 Using USDA Farm Cost and Return Survey and Agricultural Resources and 
Management Survey data from 1991 to 2008, weighted ordinary least squares regression 
analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis.  The model allowed decoupled and other 
government payments to affect fertilizer and other agricultural chemical expenditures per 
acre in three ways: directly, captured by the coefficients of decoupled payments and other 
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government payments, and indirectly through two interaction terms with  a farmer’s level 
of risk aversion and financial risk.  The direct effects are positive for both types of 
government payments, as expected.  The indirect effects captured by the interaction terms 
were negative, suggesting that the effects of government payments decrease at higher 
levels of risk aversion and financial risk.   
 Thus, government payments can ease credit constraints under imperfect credit 
markets by increasing a farmer’s total wealth (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006).  Moreover, 
decoupled direct payments and other government payments can affect a farmers risk 
preferences by increasing total assets.  Similarly, decoupled direct payments and other 
government payments can reduce levels of risk aversion by guaranteeing a level of 
revenue that is not tied to production (Hennessy, 1998).   
The marginal effects evaluated at the mean of both types of government payments 
were positive.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the marginal effects of decoupled direct 
payments on fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals expenditures per acre evaluated at 
the means was two to three times greater than the marginal effects of other government 
payments. 
 Because data is not available after 2008, the regression analysis was not used to 
test for changes in production decisions due to policy changes in the 2008 Farm Bill.  
However, the theoretical model illustrates that the ACRE program may be implicitly 
coupled to production because base yield is determined by an Olympic moving average 
that changes every year.  Therefore, farmers have the opportunity to change base yield 
each year and will do so in order to maximize their expected utility of wealth. 
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Implications 
  The results may have significant implications for future agricultural policies.  
The marginal effects of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals expenditures per acre evaluated at the mean was two to three times greater than 
the marginal effect of other government payments evaluated at the mean, suggesting that 
decoupled payments affect the intensive margin more than other government payments.  
Thus, decoupled payments can be more production distorting and possibly more 
environmental harmful than other government payments.  Since in the model other 
government payments included non-distortive lump sum payments and fully coupled 
price supports, the effect of government payments on fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemical expenditures per acre serves as a lower bound on the effect of coupled price 
supports. However, it is likely that coupled payments make up the majority of other 
government payments. 
 Hence, the results of the empirical model suggest that the move towards 
decoupled payments may lead to greater production distortions through their affect on the 
intensive margin.   The results also support previous research that a farmer’s expectation 
of future updating acts as a coupling mechanism linking decoupled payments to 
production (Bhaskar & Beghin, 2010; Coble, Miller, & Hudson, 2008).   
Although changes to production decisions from the newest decoupled direct 
payment program, ACRE, could not be tested empirically, an important implication is 
that the ACRE program introduced in 2008 set historic yield to an Olympic moving 
average, meaning that each year the historic period changes.  This policy may create a 
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link between current acreage and input decisions and future program crop payments and 
therefore be in violation of standing World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. 
 The theoretical and empirical results have major implications for the future of 
U.S. agricultural policies as well as international policies within the WTO.  The 1994 
Agreement on Agriculture required member countries to reduce production distorting 
policies, leading the US to introduce decoupled payments.  However, if these types of 
payments have a larger affect on agricultural chemical use than coupled payments, the 
introduction of decoupled payments may have increased production distortions via their 
impact on the intensive margin rather than decreasing production distortions as intended.  
Thus, even WTO sanctioned ‘green box’ policies may distort production.  Furthermore, 
the movement towards decoupled payments in the US and away from coupled payments 
may increase agricultural chemical use, with negative impacts on the rural environment.   
 If the US wants to support farmers’ income without distorting production, policies 
must be implemented on a one-time basis and not updated every four to seven years.  The 
original intention of the 1996 FAIR Act was to introduce a temporary decoupled payment 
program (production flexibility contracts) that would be eliminated after seven years.  In 
2002, production flexibility contracts were eliminated only to be replaced by two other 
decoupled payments (fixed direct payments and countercyclical payments) Hence, Milton 
Friedman may have been correct to say, “Nothing is so permanent as a temporary 
government program” and farmers recognize that once implemented, policies tend to 
stick around.   
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Limitations and Further Research 
 To more fully understand the link between decoupled payments, updating and 
agricultural chemical use more research is needed to overcome the limitations  of this 
research.  First, the lack of panel data means that year-to-year changes in a specific 
farmer’s production decisions could not be tracked.  The use of panel data would grant a 
better understanding of how both the extensive and intensive production margins are 
impacted by policy changes.   
 Furthermore, Phase III data only includes aggregate total expenditures of fertilizer 
and other agricultural chemicals, not actual quantities per acre.  Quantities of fertilizer 
and agricultural chemicals per acre should be used in the analysis rather farm-level total 
expenditures to gain a better understanding of how different types of government 
payments affect the intensive margin.  Phase II data contains input quantities data on a 
crop specific field-level basis, but Phase II data does not contain information about 
decoupled payments because these payments are received at the farm-level, not the field-
level.  A limited analysis could be conducted using the small number of farms that are 
questioned during both Phase II and Phase III.  Quantity data could also be used to 
determine how decoupled direct payments affect environmental quality by examining the 
use of particularly environmentally hazardous agricultural chemicals.   
 Additionally, because the data available did not separate other government 
payments into lump sum payments and coupled price supports, it was not possible to 
examine the exact magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments relative to 
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coupled payments.  Future research should aim to further separate other government 
payments into lump sum transfers and coupled payments.   
 This thesis focused on the effect of government payments on the use of 
agricultural chemicals.  However, similar models could analyze other non-farm inputs to 
determine if the affect of government payments on the intensive margins of these inputs 
is similar. Lastly, the theoretical model illustrating that ACRE program payments 
implicitly create a link between current acreage and input decisions and future program 
















Comparison of Partially and Fully Decoupled Payments 










Years  1996 – 2002 2002 – 2012 2002 – 2012 2008 - 2012 
Type of Policy Fully decoupled Partially decoupled, linked to price not production 
Total 
Expenditure 
$5 – 6 billion annually ~ $4 billion annually unknown 






Wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, 
upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other 
oilseeds, and peanuts. 
Wheat, corn, barley, 
grain sorghum, oats, 
upland cotton, rice, 
soybeans, other 
oilseeds, peanuts, dry 
peas, lentils, small 
chickpeas, and large 
chickpeas 
Eligibility One time 
enrollment 






payments up to 
50% before 
harvest 
Annual agreement, must 
decide how to define 
base acres and payment 
yield 
Alternative to receiving 
CCPs; must remain 
enrolled until 2012; 
program reduces all 
fixed direct payments 
to the farm by 20% 
Calculation of 
Payment Yield 
Set for each 
commodity in 
FAIR Act 
Set for each 
commodity in 
FSRI Act 
1. Use current program 
yields, OR update to: 
2. Program Yields + 
{70% of (Farm’s 
average yield from 1998 
to 2001) – (Current 
program Yields)} 
3. 93.5 % of 1998-2001 
average yields. 
Benchmark State yield 
is a commodity and 
state specific measure 
of the moving Olympic 








CY 2002 – 
2008: 85% of 
base acres in 
selected 
commodity 
CY 2009 – 
2011: 83.3% 






1. Payment acreage that 
would have been used 
for 2002 PFC payments 
+ average oilseed 
plantings in 1998-2001 
OR 
2. 4-year average of total 
acres planted + those 
unable to be planted due 
to weather conditions in 
1998-2001 
CY 2009-2011: 83.3% 
of base acres planted or 
considered planted in 
selected commodity 
CY 2012: 85% of base 
acres in selected 
commodity 




Table B.1.  Average Harvested Acreage of Program Crops in Extended 











































Corn 278.5 243.6 228.3 103.6 184.5 134.5 299.8 160.3 234.8 
Cotton 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rice 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sorghum 1.8 0.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 13.8 24.8 0.1 5.2 
Soybean 245.3 224.2 198.5 111.7 201.2 239.2 140.5 212.0 245.5 
Barley 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 10.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 5.5 
Oats 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.1 3.4 0.8 1.7 0.8 7.8 
Wheat 18.0 16.8 0.6 15.3 72.4 38.7 66.7 43.5 179.8 
Oilseed 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 24.9 
Pulse Crop 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.1 5.4 0.0 1.8 
Peanuts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 










































Average decoupled payment per acre Percent receiving decoupled payment
 107 
 
Figure B.2.  Value of Production in Extended Heartland Region, 1991-2008 
 
 


































Marginal Effects of Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency  
Table C.1.  Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on 
Fertilizer Expenditures Evaluated at the Mean 
 Marginal Effects Evaluated at the Mean  Mean 
 GOV  DP  INSURE  SOLVE  GOV  DP  INSURE  SOLVE 
Whole Model                
1991-2008 0.08  0.14  -32.25  0.86  9.81  4.88  0.06  0.10 
                
Expected Breaks                
1991-1995 0.20  -  -31.31  0.37  11.87  -  0.05  0.12 
1996-2001 0.08  0.12  -31.82  2.85  10.90  7.49  0.06  0.10 
2002-2008 0.07  0.21  -35.13  0.22  6.61  7.40  0.06  0.08 
                
Actual Breaks                
1991-1995 0.20  -  -31.31  0.37  11.87    0.05  0.12 
1996-2003 0.07  0.14  -29.33  1.40  9.66  7.27  0.06  0.11 
2004-2008 0.06  0.21  -36.97  6.24  7.21  7.72  0.06  0.06 
Notes: Marginal effects of decoupled direct payments per acre (DP) and all other government payments per acre (GOV) on fertilizer expenditures per 
acre operated are evaluated at the mean of the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures (INSURE) and ratio of total farm financial debt to total farm 
financial assets (SOLVE).  Marginal effects of INSURE and SOLVE are evaluated at the mean of DP and GOV.  GOV, DP, INSURE, and SOLVE are 




Table C.2.  Marginal Effects of Decoupled Direct Payments, Other Government Payments, Insurance, and Solvency on 
Other Agricultural Chemical Expenditures Evaluated at the Mean 
 Marginal Effects Evaluated at the Mean  Mean 
 GOV  DP  INSURE  SOLVE  GOV  DP  INSURE  SOLVE 
Whole Model                
1991-2008 0.06  0.11  -17.98  2.34  9.81  4.88  0.06  0.10 
                
Expected Breaks                
1991-1995 0.13  -  -23.17  3.75  11.87    0.05  0.12 
1996-2001 0.04  0.14  -15.53  4.14  10.90  7.49  0.06  0.10 
2002-2008 0.04  0.13  -7.57  0.23  6.61  7.40  0.06  0.08 
                
Actual Breaks                
1991-1995 0.13  -  -23.17  3.75  11.87    0.05  0.12 
1996-1999 0.07  0.22  -14.95  7.19  6.62  7.34  0.06  0.10 
2000-2008 0.03  0.09  -11.70  0.39  9.82  7.50  0.06  0.08 
Notes: Marginal effects of decoupled direct payments per acre (DP) and all other government payments per acre (GOV) on other agricultural chemical 
expenditures per acre are evaluated at the mean of the ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures (INSURE) and ratio of total farm financial debt to 
total farm financial assets (SOLVE).  Marginal effects of INSURE and SOLVE are evaluated at the mean of DP and GOV.  GOV, DP, INSURE, and 




Estimation of Structural Breaks 
Table D.1.  Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural Breaks Around 
Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008: Fertilizer Model 
 2 Breaks  3 Breaks (include 2006) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1994 16.16 15.30 15.72 16.81 17.63  14.00 13.26 13.21 13.43 13.68 
1995 15.07 14.34 14.91 16.31 17.30  13.28 12.61 12.67 13.11 13.46 
1996 16.44 16.94 18.05 19.26 20.40  14.19 14.33 14.72 15.03 15.52 
1997 14.71 15.11 16.09 17.35 18.34  13.13 13.22 13.55 13.94 14.33 
1998 14.53 14.68 15.86 17.10 17.96  12.97 12.92 13.39 13.76 14.08 
Note: Largest F-statistic (20.40) found in test for structural breaks in 1996 and 2004.  However, an 
additional F-test comparing model with breaks in 1996 and 2004 to hypothesized model with breaks in 
1996 and 2002 found no significant difference (F-stat=0.858, p=1).  
 
Table D.2.  Iterative Chow Test Statistics Estimating Structural Breaks Around 
Policy Changes in 1996, 2002, and 2008: Other Agricultural Chemicals Model 
 2 Breaks  3 Breaks (Include 2006) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1994 13.60 11.69 12.50 10.84 11.34  10.92 9.77 9.56 8.66 8.51 
1995 13.85 11.90 12.59 11.05 11.41  11.08 9.88 9.61 8.78 8.55 
1996 15.03 12.72 13.46 12.21 12.63  11.85 10.43 10.19 9.55 9.35 
1997 14.17 12.76 13.92 13.58 14.08  11.42 10.56 10.63 10.57 10.47 
1998 11.92 10.84 11.99 11.89 12.21  9.85 9.26 9.32 9.43 9.20 
Note: Largest F-statistic (15.03) found in test for structural breaks in 1996 and 2000.  An additional 
Chow test comparing model with breaks in 1996 and 2000 to hypothesized model with breaks in 1996 
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